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PANZER V. DOYLE: THE WISCONSIN SUPREME
COURT FIRES A NEAR FATAL SHOT AT
THE "NEW BUFFALO"

INTRODUCTION

Gambling is the latest fashionable vice.1 Poker tournaments occupy
precious primetime television slots, internet gambling has exploded,
and Las Vegas has seen a resurgence of fame that eclipses its days of
the Rat Pack.2 Amidst this gambling craze, many of the nation's Native American tribes have come to rely upon gambling as a continuing
means of subsistence. For these tribes, gambling has become what
some commentators have called the "new buffalo."' 3 Like the buffalo
of old, this new buffalo is not impervious to extinction. This time,
however, the metaphorical rifle lies in the hands of politicians and
judges.
In Panzerv. Doyle,4 the Wisconsin Supreme Court fired a near fatal
shot at this new buffalo when it held that the governor, as the representative of the State, exceeded his constitutional authority when he
agreed to Indian gaming compact provisions that expanded the scope
of permitted gaming 5 and caused the gaming compacts to last indefinitely. 6 That decision, however, rests upon a fractured legal founda1. See, e.g., Brooke Williams, Shoppers Going All in for Casino Presents; Poker Kits, Mini
Slots a Major Holiday Draw, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Dec. 23, 2004, at Al (noting that the
increasing popularity of casino-style gambling has led many shoppers to purchase related items
for presents during the holiday season).
2. See, e.g., Matthew Garrahan, Internet Betting Move Forecast to Tempt Bookmakers Back
Onshore, FIN. TIMES (London), Oct. 20, 2004, at 3 (noting that in September, 2004, almost sixteen percent of all Britons who used the Internet visited an online gambling site); Alessandra
Stanley, Poker Itself Is the Winner, Along With the Grifters, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2005, at El
(noting that "[glambling, and especially poker, has invaded almost every form of television");
Ben White, Consolidationon the Strip Faces Antitrust Scrutiny, WASH. POST, July 16, 2004, at El
(noting that "[w]ith televised poker tournaments, network dramas and reality shows, Sin City
has once again captured a central spot in the public imagination").
3. See, e.g., Michael Grant, Comment, Seminole Tribe v. Florida-Extinctionof the "New Buffalo?," 22 AM. INDIAN L. REV.171 (noting that "[m]any Native Americans refer to Indian gaming as the 'New Buffalo"').
4. 680 N.W.2d 666 (Wis. 2004).
5. This Note uses the term "gaming" to refer to gambling operations conducted by Indian
tribes. Contrarily, this Note uses the term "gambling" when referring to gambling in general.
6. See infra notes 88-90 and accompanying text. The legal framework for permissible Indian
gaming rests in the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. § 2701 (2000). Pursuant to that
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tion that undermines the entire majority decision. 7 Moreover, the
court's decision creates uncertainty with respect to future compacts
because it provides no guidelines for the proper scope of gaming compacts. 8 Lastly, the decision places the future of Wisconsin Indian gaming in a precarious situation due to a sister case that has
simultaneously worked its way through the Wisconsin court system. 9
This Note will explore the court's opinion in Panzer. Specifically,
Part II briefly discusses the history of Indian gaming in general.1 0
Thereafter, the discussion turns to the history of Indian gaming in
Wisconsin, paying particular attention to the various compacts executed throughout the years.1 Part III sets out the case in detail, including the relevant facts, the majority's holding, and the dissenting
opinion. 12 With that groundwork in place, Part IV analyzes the legal
soundness of the majority opinion.' 3 Part V starts by explaining the
post-Panzer sequence of events, and then goes on to explore the potential ramifications that Panzer will have regarding future compacts
and Indian gaming in Wisconsin.' 4 Finally, Part VI concludes that the
majority decision misinterpreted the federal statute regulating Indian
gaming and furthermore failed to provide any guidelines for future
15
compact negotiations.
II.

BACKGROUND

The following section provides a brief history of Indian gaming on a
national level, including the Supreme Court's initial recognition of the
"right" to Indian gaming and Congress's response to the Court. 16
With that in mind, this section also examines the history of gambling
and Indian gaming in Wisconsin, with particular emphasis on the vari17
ous gaming compacts between the tribes and the state.
law, states can enter into compacts with Native American tribes which permit the tribes to conduct gaming operations within the state. See generally id.
7. See infra notes 183-219 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 313-327 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 290-312 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 18-50 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 51-106 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 107-179 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 180-282 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 283-327 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 328-338 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 18-50 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 51-106 and accompanying text.
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The History of Indian Gaming on a National Level

Indian gaming operations began in the United States primarily as a
means for indigent Native American tribes to make money. Predictably, the growth of such operations caught the attention of state
lawmakers and, eventually, the United States Supreme Court and
Congress. Nevertheless, Indian gaming has continued to experience
exponential growth.
1. Indian Gaming Facilities Crop up Across the Nation
Beginning in the late sixties, and continuing through the present,
the federal government has generally pursued a policy of tribal self18
sufficiency while simultaneously cutting federal subsidies to tribes.
During that same time, however, rampant unemployment on reservations has left a large percentage of Native Americans living at or below the poverty level. 19 In the face of those devastating conditions,
20
some tribes saw the answer in bingo and related gaming operations.
21
Early Indian gaming generally took the form of high stakes bingo.
These early gaming operations were highly unregulated. Furthermore, they existed in a state of confusion and controversy due to conflicting judicial opinions. 22 Much of this confusion stemmed from the
fact that Native American tribes exist as quasi-sovereign domestic nations. 23 At the same time, Public Law 280, which Congress passed in
1953, provides some states with criminal jurisdiction over tribal
lands. 24 Accordingly, the conflicting legal doctrines of tribal sover18. See Kathryn R.L. Rand & Steven A. Light, Virtue or Vice? How IGRA Shapes the Politics
of Native American Gaming, Sovereignty, and Identity, 4 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 381, 387-92
(1997) (discussing the federal government's policies of assimilation, relocation, and self-determination as they relate to Native Americans).
19. Id: at 393.
20. See William E. Schmidt, Bingo Boom Brings Tribes Profit and Conflict, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
29, 1983, at Al (estimating that forty tribes nationwide began high stakes bingo in the eighteen
months prior to March 1983 in order to redress tribal economic concerns and noting that many
more tribes are considering similar operations).
21. See generally id.
22. See infra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
23. The legal framework for tribal sovereignty is rooted in a series of early United States
Supreme Court cases. See Steven Andrew Light & Kathryn R.L. Rand, Reconciling the Paradox
of Tribal Sovereignty: Three Frameworksfor Developing Indian Gaming Law and Policy, 4 NEV.
L.J. 262, 268-69 (2003-2004); see also Rand & Light, supra note 18, at 387-88. Three of these
cases, Johnson v. M'lntosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823), Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,20 U.S. 1 (1831), and
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832), establish the general principle that Native American
tribes are sovereign, domestic nations subject to Congress's plenary power. See Edward P. Sullivan, Reshuffling the Deck: ProposedAmendments to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 45 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1107, 1115 (1994) (indicating that "the scope of federal legislative power over
Native American concerns has been interpreted as being 'plenary"').
24. 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a) (2000) states in pertinent part:
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eignty and Public Law 280 caused different courts to reach varying
conclusions over the validity of these early forms of Indian gaming,
with the central issue being whether states could enforce their criminal laws relating to gambling against tribal reservations. 2 5 Due to

these conflicting opinions, the United States Supreme Court intervened to help bring national uniformity to the issue.
2.

The Supreme Court Recognizes the Tribal "Right" to Gaming

In 1987, the Supreme Court decided a hallmark case, Californiav.
Cabazon Band of Mission Indians.2 6 That case arose when the
Cabazon Band of Mission Indians (Cabazon Band) began to conduct
high stakes bingo on its reservation. 27 The Cabazon Band also opened

a card room for draw poker and other card games.2 8 Though these
operations were approved by the Secretary of the Interior of the fed-

eral government, California sought to enforce a state criminal law
which placed extensive regulations on bingo games, including a $250
Each of the States or Territories listed in the following table shall have jurisdiction
over offenses committed by or against Indians in the areas of Indian country listed
opposite the name of the State or Territory to the same extent that such State or Territory has jurisdiction over offenses committed elsewhere within the State or Territory,
and the criminal laws of such State or Territory shall have the same force and effect
within such Indian country as they have elsewhere within the State or Territory:
Wisconsin ...

All Indian country within the State.

Id.
28 U.S.C. § 1360(a) (2000) states in pertinent part:
Each of the States listed in the following table shall have jurisdiction over civil causes
of action between Indians or to which Indians are parties which arise in the areas of
Indian country listed opposite the name of the State to the same extent that such State
has jurisdiction over other civil causes of action, and those civil laws of such State that
are of general application to private persons or private property shall have the same
force and effect within such Indian country as they have elsewhere within the State:
Wisconsin ...

All Indian country within the State.

Id.
Public Law 280 was conceived and enacted during a period when many tribes were experiencing
rampant lawlessness on their reservations. See Sullivan, supra note 23, at 1115-16 (explaining
that "Congress approved Public Law 280 with the primary goal of providing criminal jurisdiction
to states over Native American lands where lawlessness was prevailing at the time"). By passing
Public Law 280, Congress explicitly granted six states, including Wisconsin, jurisdiction over
criminal activity and civil causes of action on tribal reservations. See 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a); 28
U.S.C. § 1360(a). Accordingly, criminal prohibitions on gambling in these states could ostensibly be enforced upon tribal lands.
25. See Barona Group of Capitan Grande Band of Mission Indians v. Duffy, 694 F.2d 1185
(9th Cir. 1982); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Butterworth, 658 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1981); Oneida
Tribe of Indians v. Wisconsin, 518 F. Supp. 712 (W.D. Wis. 1981).
26. 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
27. Id. at 204-05.
28. Id. at 205.
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prize cap per game.2 9 In deciding whether California could enforce
those laws against the reservation, the Court recognized that while
Native American "tribes retain 'attributes of sovereignty' . . . [that]
'sovereignty is dependent on, and subordinate to... the Federal Government." 30 The Court then found that states, through their authority under Public Law 280, can enforce state gambling laws on
reservations if the intent of the state law is to prohibit the specific
conduct at issue. 31 Specifically, the Court stated:
[I]f the intent of a state law is generally to prohibit certain conduct,
it falls within [Public Law] 280's grant of criminal jurisdiction, but if
the state law generally permits the conduct at issue, subject to regu280
lation, it must be classified as civil/regulatory and [Public Law]
32
does not authorize its enforcement on an Indian reservation.
In other words, "[t]he shorthand test is whether the conduct at issue
' 33
violates the State's public policy."
When the Court turned to the California statutes in question, it concluded that California public policy is to generally permit gambling
despite the extensive regulations. 34 In so holding, the Court reasoned
as follows:
California does not prohibit all forms of gambling. California itself operates a state lottery... and daily encourages its citizens to
participate in this state-run gambling. California also permits parimutuel horse-race betting .... Although certain enumerated gambling games are prohibited under [California state law], games not
the card games played in the Cabazon card
enumerated, including
35
club are permissible.
Furthermore, the Court noted that "bingo is legally sponsored by
'36
many different organizations and is widely played in California.
Given these facts, the Court held that "California regulates rather
than prohibits gambling in general and bingo in particular," and thus
the state had no jurisdiction to enforce its criminal laws relating to
37
bingo against the reservation.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 207 (quoting United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975); Washington v.
Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 154 (1980)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
31. Id. at 209.
32. Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 209.
33. Id.
34. See id. at 210.
35. Id. (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
36. Id. at 211.
37. Id.
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CongressionalResponse: The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act

Cabazon was a victory for tribes nationwide; however, Congress
was already in action. 38 In fact, almost immediately after the case was
decided, Congress introduced a bill which would later become, in
39
slightly amended form, the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA).
One stated purpose of IGRA was "to provide a statutory basis for the
operation of gaming by Indian tribes as a means of promoting tribal
economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal governments."' 40 Most commentators, however, agree that IGRA was intended to balance the interest of the tribes in maintaining gaming as a
means of promoting self-sufficiency, and the interest of the states in
regulating gaming. 41 In order to help effectuate that purpose, IGRA
divided Indian gaming into three separate types: Class I, Class II, and
Class 111.42 Of these three categories, Class III gaming, which gener43
ally encompasses casino-style gambling, is the most lucrative.
After separating Indian gaming into different categories, IGRA sets
44
forth a comprehensive scheme for the regulation of Indian gaming.
38. Sullivan, supra note 23, at 1124 (noting that as early as 1983 legislators on Capitol Hill
were circulating bills to regulate Indian gaming); see also Karen S. McFadden, Note, The Stakes
Are Too High to Gamble Away Tribal Self-Government, Self-Sufficiency, and Economic Development When Amending the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 21 J. CORP. L. 807, 810 (1996) (noting
that "Congress enacted the IGRA on October 17, 1988, after nearly five years of proposals and
deliberations"):
39. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-21 (2000); see also Sullivan, supra note 23, at 1125.
40. 25 U.S.C. § 2702(1).
41. See, e.g., Michael D. Cox, The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act: An Overview, 7 ST.
THOMAS L. REV. 769, 770 (1995) (noting that IGRA "was a political compromise that pleased
neither the states nor the tribes"); William Bennett Cooper, III, Comment, What's in the Cards
for the Future of Indian Gaming Law?, 5 VILL. SPORTS & ENr. L.J. 129 (1998); see also Light &
Rand, supra note 23, at 271-72 (stating that "IGRA was a compromise among these competing
interests: those of the tribes and the federal government, and those of the states and non-Indian
gaming interests"); Eric S. Lent, Note, Are States Beating the House?: The Validity of Tribal-State
Revenue Sharing Under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 91 GEO. L.J. 451, 453 (2003) ("Congress enacted IGRA in an effort to balance Indian autonomy in the gaming arena with state
assertions of police power over tribal gaming.") (citing S. REP. No. 100-446, at 6 (1988), reprinted
in 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3071, 3076); McFadden, supra note 38, at 808.
42. Class I gaming is defined as "social games solely for prizes of minimal value or traditional
forms of Indian gaming engaged in by individuals as a part of, or in connection with, tribal
ceremonies or celebrations." 25 U.S.C. § 2703(6). Class II gaming is, generally speaking, gaming
that involves "the game of chance commonly known as bingo," id. § 2703(7)(A)(i), and "card
games that are explicitly authorized by the laws of the State or are not explicitly prohibited by
the laws of the State and are played at any location in the State .
I..."
Id. § 2703(7)(A)(i)-(ii).
Lastly, Class III gaming is defined as "all forms of gaming that are not [C]lass I gaming or [C]lass
II gaming." Id. § 2703(8).
43. See Kelly B. Kramer, Current Issues in Indian Gaming: Casino Lands and Gaming Compacts, 7 GAMING L. REV. 329 (2003) (noting that Class III gaming is the most lucrative and
subject to the most regulations).
44. See generally Cox, supra note 41.
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Specifically, IGRA provides that "Class I gaming on Indian land is
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Indian tribes . . . -45 A tribe
may conduct Class II gaming under IGRA if the "gaming is located
within a State that permits such gaming for any purpose by any person, organization or entity ...."46 Class III gaming, however, is subject to additional regulations that grant the state more authority to
regulate gaming on tribal land.
For example, under IGRA,
Class III gaming activities shall be lawful on Indian lands only if
such activities are... [1] located in a State that permits such gaming
for any purpose by any person, organization, or entity .... and [2]

conducted in conformance with a Tribal-State compact entered into

47
by the Indian tribe and the State ...that is in effect.

These compacts are negotiated between the state and the tribe and
govern the conduct of Class III gaming. 48 In order to execute such a
compact, the tribe can request that the state enter into compact negotiations, and "the State shall negotiate with the Indian tribe in good
faith to enter into such a compact. '49 With this framework in place,
50
Indian gaming has exploded across the nation.
B.

The Rise of Gaming in Wisconsin

Wisconsin tribes have not missed out on the gaming phenomenon.
In fact, each of Wisconsin's eleven, federally recognized tribes has en45. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(1).
46. Id. § 2710(b)(1)(A).
47. Id. § 2710(d)(1)(A)-(C).
48. See id. § 2710(d)(3).
49. Id. § 2710(d)(3)(A).
50. In 1997, Congress formed the National Gambling Impact Study Commission (NGISC),
which was charged with the very broad and difficult task of conducting a comprehensive legal
and factual study of the social and economic implications of gambling in the United States.
NATIONAL GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMMISSION REPORT 6-1 [hereinafter NGISC REPORT],
available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ngisc/reports/fullrpt.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2006).
Pursuant to this study, the NGISC found that in the decade following IGRA (1988-1997), Indian
"gaming revenues grew more than 30-fold, from $212 million to $6.7 billion." Id. at 6-1-6-2.
During that same time, traditional commercial casino gambling revenues approximately
doubled, "from $9.6 billion to $20.5 billion." Id. at 6-2. Additional reports from the National
Indian Gaming Commission indicate that Indian gaming revenues have continued to increase,
with total revenues reaching approximately $16.7 billion in 2003. See National Indian Gaming
Commission, Chart: Growth in Indian Gaming, http://www.nigc.gov/nigc/tribes/revenue-03-95.jsp
(last visited Apr. 25, 2006); see National Indian Gaming Commission, Chart: Tribal Gaming Revenues (in thousands) by Region Fiscal Year 2003 and 2002, http://www.nigc.gov/nigc/tribes/revenue-03-02.jsp (last visited Apr. 18, 2006). Furthermore, while in 1988 there were only about
seventy tribally owned casinos and bingo halls, in 2003 there were 354 tribally owned gaming
facilities. National Indian Gaming Association: Indian Gaming Facts, http://www.indiangaming.
org/library/indian-gaming-facts/index.shtml (last visited Feb. 23, 2006). See NGISC REPORT,
supra, at 6-2.
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tered into a gaming compact with the state. 51 Therefore, in order to
contextualize Panzer, it is necessary to discuss the history of Indian
52
gaming in Wisconsin.

1.

The Legislature Delegated the Power to Execute Gaming
Compacts to the Governor

Pursuant to IGRA, the Wisconsin Legislature enacted Section
14.035 in 1990.5 3 Section 14.035 provides in full: "The governor may,

on behalf of this state, enter into any compact that has been negotiated under 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d). ''54 In enacting this law, both the Wis-

consin Assembly and Senate rejected amendments requiring
legislative approval of any gaming compacts. 55 Notably, both Mary
Panzer and John Gard (the plaintiffs in Panzer) voted in favor of Sec56
tion 14.035 sans the proposed amendments.
2.

The 1992 Original Compacts and Their 1998 Amendments

In 1992, pursuant to the federal court's decision in Lac du Flambeau
Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. State of Wisconsin (Lac
du Flambeau),57 which mandated that the governor negotiate with
tribes for gaming operations under IGRA, then-Governor Tommy G.

Thompson and each Wisconsin tribe formally entered into gaming
compacts (Original Compacts). 58 These Original Compacts limited
the permissible Class III gaming operations to slots, blackjack, and
pull-tabs or break-open tickets. 59 Furthermore, each of these Original

Compacts contained a provision that limited their duration to seven
years with an automatic renewal mechanism that extended the com-

pact for additional five-year terms until one party served written notice of nonrenewal. 60 Additionally, the Original Compacts provided
51. Department of Administration, State of Wisconsin Indian Gaming & Regulatory Compliance, http://www.doa.state.wi.us/gaming/index.asp (last visited Feb. 23, 2006) [hereinafter Wisconsin Indian Gaming and Regulatory Compliance].
52. See Panzer v. Doyle, 680 N.W.2d 666, 670 (Wis. 2004) ("To understand the factual and
legal issues that affect our decision, we recapitulate our state's unique history with respect to
legalized gambling.").
53. See id. at 674.
54. Wis. STAT. § 14.035 (2000).
55. See Panzer,680 N.W.2d at 674 (noting that before Section 14.035 was passed, "both houses
of the legislature rejected amendments requiring the legislature to ratify these compacts").
56. See id. at 718 n.111.
57. 770 F. Supp. 480 (W.D. Wis. 1991).
58. See id. at 481.
59. See, e.g., Forest County Potawatomi Community of Wisconsin and State of Wisconsin
Gaming Compact of 1992, § IV(A)-(B) (signed June 3, 1992) [hereinafter Original Compact],
available at http://www.doa.state.wi.us/docs-view2.asp?docid=2153 (last visited Feb. 23, 2006).
60. See, e.g., id. § XXV(A)-(B).
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that all of the tribes were to pay a total of $350,000 to the state, with

each tribe contributing a portion that directly related to the amount
as compared to the overall
wagered in each specific tribe's casino(s)
61
amount wagered in all tribal casinos.
When the Original Compacts approached expiration in 1997 and
1998, Governor Thompson realized that gaming revenues created a
potential windfall for the state with marginal expenditures. 62 Accordingly, Governor Thompson refused to renew the gaming compacts un63
less the tribes made considerable monetary concessions to the state.
After a lengthy period of negotiations, the Governor and the various

tribes eventually reached agreements (1998 Compact Amendments)
to amend and continue the Original Compacts. 64 Under the 1998
Compact Amendments, the State received approximately $24 million

in addition to the $350,000 already paid under the Original
Compacts.
3.

65

Wisconsin ConstitutionalProvisions and Statutes Relating to
Gambling

Wisconsin law has evolved significantly over the years with respect
to gambling, with many changes taking place within the past fifteen
61. The Pbtawatomi Compact of 1992 provides:
As soon as all tribes within the State that have requested negotiation of Class III gaming compacts have concluded compacts with the State, the Tribe shall pay to the State,
as reimbursement for State costs of regulation under this Compact, an annual amount
for each State fiscal year computed as follows: the share of $350,000 determined by
multiplying that amount by a fraction whose denominator is the sum of the gross annual Class III gaming handle of those tribes for the previous fiscal year, and whose
numerator is the Tribe's gross annual Class III gaming handle for that same fiscal year.
Id. § XXIV(B).
62. See Wis. LEGISLATIVE AUDIT BUREAU, WISCONSIN GAMING BOARD (1997), available at
http://www.legis.state.wi.us/lab/reports/97-14tear.htm (indicating that in 1996, total tribal gaming
profits in Wisconsin were $280.1 million and revenues totaled $682.7 million).
63. See Amy Rinard, Raise State's Cut or No Tribal Deals, Governor Insists, MILWAUKEE J.
Jan. 19, 1996, at 1 (reporting that "Gov. Tommy Thompson said Thursday he will not
approve new state-tribal gaming compacts unless the state gets more money from Indian tribes.
'I'm not going to sign any extensions of compacts without more money on the table,' Thompson
said."); see also Casino Tribes Get Warning, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 26, 1997, at M3 (quoting Governor
Tommy Thompson as saying "[t]hey're playing with a great deal of fire right now if in fact they
call my bluff").
64. See WISCONSIN LEGISLATOR BRIEFING BOOK 2003-04, at P-12 [hereinafter LEGISLATOR
BRIEFING BOOK], available at http://www.legis.state.wi.us/lc/02brief/state-tribal.pdf (last visited
Oct. 21, 2004). The amendments to each tribe's original compact are available on the Internet.
See Wisconsin Indian Gaming and Regulatory Compliance, supra note 51.
65. See LEGISLATOR BRIEFING BOOK, supra note 64, at P-13.
SENTINEL,
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years. 66 Today, the Wisconsin state constitution and certain criminal
statutes define the scope of permissible gambling activities. 67 In its
original form, however, the Wisconsin state constitution forbid the
legislature from ever authorizing a "lottery. ' 68 The term lottery was
subsequently interpreted by Wisconsin courts and attorneys general to
include all forms of gambling. 69 Then in 1987, the people of Wisconsin
ratified a state constitutional amendment which permitted not only a
state-owned lottery, but also pari-mutuel on-track betting. 70 Accordingly, the state appeared to be relaxing its position with respect to
gambling. But in 1993, the people approved another state constitutional amendment.
This 1993 state constitutional amendment (1993 Constitutional
Amendment) provides the current relevant law with respect to gambling and states in part: "Except as provided in this section, the legislature may not authorize gambling in any form."' 71 That section of the
constitution enumerates the following specific forms of gambling:
bingo; raffles; pari-mutuel on-track betting; and a State operated lottery. 72 The constitution goes on to state:
Notwithstanding the authorization of a state lottery under par.
(a), the following games, or games simulating any of the following
games, may not be conducted by the state as a lottery: 1) any game
in which winners are selected based on the results of a race or sporting event; 2) any banking card game, including blackjack, baccarat
or chemin de fer; 3) poker; 4) roulette; 5) craps or any other game
that involves rolling dice; 6) keno .. .73
In addition to the 1993 Constitutional Amendment, Section 945
criminalizes gambling in general. 74 Particularly, that law makes it a
Class B misdemeanor to place a "bet," which the statute defines as "a
bargain in which the parties agree that, dependent upon chance even
though accompanied by some skill, one stands to win or lose some66. See generally LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU, STATE OF WISCONSIN, The Evolution of
Legalized Gambling in Wisconsin, Res. Bull. 00-1 (2000), available at http://www.legis.state.wi.us/
Irb/pubs/rb/001bl.pdf.
67. See Wis. CONST. art. IV, § 24; see also Wis. STAT. § 945 (2004).
68. See Panzer v. Doyle, 680 N.W.2d 666, 671 (2004) (citing Wis. CONST. art. IV, § 24 (1848)).
69. See id. (citing Kayden Indus., Inc. v. Murphy, 150 N.W.2d 447 (Wis. 1967); State v. Laven,
71 N.W.2d 287 (Wis. 1955); State ex rel. Regez v. Blumer, 294 N.W. 491 (Wis. 1940)).
70. See id. at 674-75. "Pari-mutuel Betting" is defined as "[a] form of wagering, generally on
the outcome of horse or dog races, whereby all bets made on a particular race are pooled then
paid, less a management fee, to holders of winning tickets." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 770 (6th

ed. 1991).
71. WIs. CONST. art. IV, § 24(1).
72. Id. § 24(3)-(6).
73. Id. § 24(6)(c).
74. See Wis. STAT. § 945.02 (2004) (making it a misdemeanor to place a "bet").
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' 75

The statute, however,

thing of value specified in the agreement.

exempts bets that are placed pursuant to a form 76of gambling authorized under the 1993 Constitutional Amendment.
4.

The 2003 Doyle Amendments

In 2002, there was a changing of the gubernatorial guard, which resulted in the incumbent Governor Scott McCallum being defeated by
the challenger, Attorney General James E. Doyle, who was considered by many to be gaming-friendly. 77 Upon entering office, Doyle
inherited a large budget shortfall. 78 Accordingly, Governor Doyle

turned to tribal gaming in an attempt to generate more money for the
state. 79 In particular, Doyle sought to increase tribal payments from
$24 million to almost $240 million. 80 While the tribes were receptive

to higher payments, they demanded concessions from the state, including long-term compacts, higher betting limits, twenty-four hour
gaming, and the authority to offer additional casino-style games such

as craps, roulette, and poker. 81 On February 19, 2003, Governor
Doyle and the Forest County Potawatomi Community of Wisconsin
(Potawatomi) agreed to amend the tribe's existing gaming compact
82

(Doyle Amendments).
While controversy surrounded the Doyle Amendments, including

accusations of political favors, it is not disputed that the new amendments had a positive impact on the state's fiscal situation.83 At the
same time, the Doyle Amendments permitted unprecedented, fullscale casino operations in the State of Wisconsin. 84 For example,
while the Potawatomi could previously only conduct blackjack, slots,

and pull tabs, the Doyle Amendments permitted "[v]ariations on the
75. Id. § 945.01(1) (defining "bet").
76. See id. § 945.01(c)-(e).
77. I. Nelson Rose, Gambling and the Law: Status of Gambling Laws, 7 GAMING L. REV. 1,
12-13 (2003).
78. See A New Governor's Message, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Jan. 30, 2003, at 14A.

79. See Amy Rinard, If State Gives a Little, It Can Take More From Casinos, Tribes Say, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Feb. 19, 2003, at 1A (quoting Doyle as saying "[a]ll the people of Wisconsin should join me in acknowledging the important efforts the tribes of Wisconsin are making
toward helping the state in this difficult time").
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Amendments to the Forest County Potawatomi Community of Wisconsin and the State of
Wisconsin Gaming Compact of 1992, as amended, Feb. 18, 2003 [hereinafter Doyle Amendments], available at http://www.doa.state.wi.us/docs-view2.asp?docid=2155.
83. See Panzer v. Doyle, 680 N.W.2d 666, 682 (2004) (noting that "[a]ll the parties acknowledge that the... [Doyle Amendments are] projected to generate additional revenue for the state
at a time when additional revenue is needed").
84. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
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game of Blackjack, including, but not limited to, Spanish 21 and additional wagers offered in the game of blackjack, including additional
wagers, multiple action blackjack, bonus wagers, and progressive
blackjack wagers. '' 85 Furthermore, the Doyle Amendments permitted

the tribe to operate such games as "roulette or craps, the game of
poker or other non-house banked games, or operate games played at
Blackjack style tables, such as Let It Ride, Casino Stud, and Casino
War. ...."86 Accordingly, the Doyle Amendments provided the green

87
light to full scale casino gambling for the Potawatomi.
Most importantly, the Doyle Amendments provided that the "Compact shall continue in effect until terminated by mutual agreement of
the parties, or by a duly adopted ordinance or resolution of the Tribe
revoking the authority of the Tribe to conduct Class III gaming upon
its lands .... ",88 On each fifth anniversary of the Doyle Amendments,
however, either the Tribe or the state could propose amendments to
the compact, and on each twenty-fifth anniversary, "the State, by the
Governor as directed by an enactment of a session law by the Wisconsin Legislature, or the Tribe may propose amendments to any provision of the Compact. ' 89 For all intents and purposes, this duration

85. Doyle Amendments, supra note 82, [ 2(5) (amending section IV.A. of the Original
Compact).
86. Id. 2(8). A condition precedent for the operation of these new games was that a "Competitive Facility" must permit such games. Id. While one might consider a competitive facility to
mean other tribes within Wisconsin, in fact the Doyle Amendments define a "Competitive Facility" as "a facility within the Competitive Market Area outside of the State of Wisconsin where
lawful gaming is operated, which would be Class III gaming if the same gaming were operated by
an Indian tribe under the Act." Id. 1(N). Importantly, the "Competitive Market Area" is "the
geographical area outside of the State of Wisconsin, and within 75 miles of the State of Wisconsin
border." Id. I 1(M) (emphasis added). While seventy-five miles is not a great distance, at least
two tribally owned casinos within ten miles of the Wisconsin border operate games of blackjack,
Let-It-Ride, craps, roulette, and poker. These two tribes are the Fond du Lac Reservation Business Committee in Duluth, Minnesota (approximately six miles from the Wisconsin border) and
the Lac Vieux Desert Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians in Watersmeet, Michigan (approximately nine miles from the Wisconsin Border). See Fond-Du-Luth Casino, http://www.fond
duluthcasino.com (last visited Feb. 23, 2006) (providing information about the Fond du Lac Reservation Business Committee casino); see Lac Vieux Desert Resort Casino, http://www.lacvieux
desert.com (last visited Feb. 23, 2006) (providing information about the Lac Vieux Desert Bank
of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians' casino). See also Doyle Amendments, supra note 82,
12(C) (amending section XXIII of the Original Compact).
87. The main Potawatomi casino is located in the Menominee Valley, which in turn is located
very near downtown Milwaukee. See Potawatomi Bingo Casino, http://www.paysbig.com/visitor/
directions.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
88. See Doyle Amendments, supra note 82, 13(B) (amending section XXV of the Original
Compact).
89. Id. 14(D)(2) (amending section XXX of the Original Compact).
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provision extended the compacts indefinitely because the Potawatomi
had the sole power to withdraw.90
For the Potawatomi, the Doyle Amendments did not come cheap.
In the first and second year that the Doyle Amendments were to be in
effect, the tribe was required to pay $6.375 million to the state's genthe tribe would
eral revenue fund. 9 1 In addition, in 2004 and 2005, 92
have to pay $34.125 and $43.625 million respectively.
5. Panzer's "Sister Case"-Dairyland Greyhound Park v. Doyle
Before Doyle even had a chance to negotiate the Doyle Amendments, Dairyland Greyhound Park v. McCallum93 was working its way
through the Wisconsin court system. In that case, Dairyland Greyhound Park (Dairyland Greyhound), the owner of a dog track in
southeastern Wisconsin, brought suit seeking "an injunction prohibiting the Governor 'from entering into any new, modified, extended or
renewed gaming compacts with any Indian tribe . . . and requiring
[him] to issue timely notice of nonrenewal of each compact."' 94 In the
first reported case, the court of appeals reversed the lower court's dismissal of the case for failure to join the tribes as indispensable parties,
95
and remanded the case for further proceedings.
On remand, the trial court reached the merits of the case in an unreported opinion, and concluded that the 1993 Constitutional Amendment did not affect the gaming compacts or their extension. 96 Upon
appeal, the court of appeals declined to reach the merits of the case,
electing instead to usher the matter to the Wisconsin Supreme
Court. 97 In their opinion, the case should be expedited because the
"issues involve fundamental questions of state court jurisdiction and
the meaning of the 1993 [Constitutional] Amendment."9 8
The Wisconsin Supreme Court accepted the appellate court's invitation but failed to reach a conclusion. 99 Instead, in a per curiam decision, the supreme court stated that it is "equally divided [3-3] on
90. Id. I 13(B).
91. Id. 16(G)(1)(a) (amending section XXXI of the Original Compact).
92. Id. 9 16(G)(1)(b).
93. 655 N.W.2d 474 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002). Doyle was substituted as the defendant when he
defeated McCallum in the gubernatorial election.
94. Id. at 477.
95. Id. at 487.
96. Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc. v. Doyle, No. 03-0421, 2003 WL 21253354, at 2-3 (Wis.
Ct. App. June 2, 2003).
97. Id. at 3.
98. Id.
99. Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc. v. Doyle, 677 N.w.2d 275, 276 (Wis. 2004).
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whether to affirm the judgment of the [trial] court." 100 Because the
supreme court could not overcome the impasse, it remanded the case
back to the court of appeals.1 0 1 Notably, one justice did not participate
10 2
in the decision.

At approximately the same time it remanded Dairyland,however,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court decided Panzer. Upon remand of
Dairyland, the parties submitted new briefs taking Panzer into account. 103 Nevertheless, the court of appeals again declined to reach
the merits of the case and for the second time submitted the case back
to the supreme court. 10 4 Finally, on January 13, 2005, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court voted to accept the case for decision, and on September 7, 2005, the court heard oral arguments in the matter. 10 5 Although

the court has yet to render its opinion, it is undoubted that Dairyland
will be a case of extreme importance to the Wisconsin tribes because
10 6
the court could ostensibly eradicate Indian gaming outright.
III.

SUBJECT OPINION

In Panzer v. Doyle, the issue of Indian gaming became the province
of the Wisconsin Supreme Court. This section discusses how the court
handled the case in the context of the complex history of Indian gaming in Wisconsin. 10 7 Furthermore, this section explores the court's
conclusions and the appurtenant rationale to those conclusions.10 8
A.

Relevant Facts and the Issue Presented

The facts of the case reflect the complex history of Indian gaming
and politics in Wisconsin.10 9 With that background, and the sweeping
changes brought about by the Doyle Amendments, it is not surprising
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc. v. Doyle, No. 03-0421, 2004 WL 2522611, at 1 (Wis. Ct.
App. Nov. 4, 2004) (noting that the parties had filed new briefs taking Panzer into account).
104. Id. at 2.
105. See High Court to Hear Suit Against Casino Gambling; Kenosha Dog Track Owners Want
to Block American Indian Tribes From Running Casinos, Wis. ST. J., Jan. 13, 2005, at B3; see also
Matt Pommer, Will High Court Close Casinos?, CAP. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2005, at 3A (discussing the
September 7, 2005 oral arguments pending before the Wisconsin Supreme Court).
106. Nevertheless, this Note looks at the importance of Panzer beyond Dairyland because
Panzer will provide the framework for the compacting process in Wisconsin (assuming the Wisconsin Supreme Court will be unwilling to cut off the spigot of gaming revenue).
107. See infra notes 109-116 and accompanying text.
108. See infra notes 117-179 and accompanying text.
109. Panzer v. Doyle, 680 N.W.2d 666, 670-81 (2004).
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that these changes stirred the passions of many state legislators.'1 0 In

fact, at the same time that Governor Doyle was negotiating the Doyle
Amendments with the Potawatomi, both branches of the Wisconsin
Legislature passed multiple bills intending to limit the power of the

governor to enter into compacts.1 1 ' While these bills did not rescind
the governor's power to negotiate compacts, they all contained provisions that, in one way or another, mandated legislative approval of the
compacts before they were to become effective. 112 Doyle, however,
vetoed each of these proposed bills and the legislature could not gar-

ner enough votes to override the governor's actions. 113 After being
rebuffed by the governor's vetoes, Senator Mary Panzer and Representative John Gard (the plaintiffs) sought recourse from the state's
1 14
highest court.
In bringing their case, the plaintiffs phrased the main issues as

whether the governor exceeded his constitutional authority by agreeing to "amendments that: (1) expand[ed] the scope of gaming by ad-

ding games that were previously not permitted for any purpose by any
person, organization, or entity in Wisconsin; [and] (2) extend[ed] the
duration of the compact indefinitely so that it bec[omes] perpetual

....

Of considerable importance is the fact that the plaintiffs did

not challenge the constitutionality of Section 14.035. The court noted,

however, that despite the fact they "framed their argument in a man110. See infra notes 111-114 and accompanying text.
111. See S.B. 41, 2003-2004 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2003) (presented to the Governor on February 24, 2003); A.B. 144, 2003-2004 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2003) (presented to the Governor on
March 14, 2003); A.B. 998, 2003-2004 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2004) (presented to the Governor
on May 26, 2004).
112. For example, Senate Bill 41 stated that before the governor executed a compact with any
tribe, he or she "shall submit the proposed compact to the legislature for approval." S.B. 41 § 2.
Similarly, Assembly Bill 144 required legislative approval for any compact "that is for a period
longer than 10 years, with a renewal provision of more than 5 years... A.B. 144 § 3.
113. Doyle vetoed Senate Bill 41 on February 28, 2003. History of Senate Bill 41, www.legis.
state.wi.us/2003/data/SB41hst.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2006). Doyle vetoed Assembly Bill 144
on March 18, 2003. History of Assembly Bill 144, http://www.legis.state.wi.us/2003/data/AB144
hst.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2006). Similarly, Doyle vetoed Assembly Bill 998 on May 27, 2004,
History of Assembly Bill 998, http://www.legis.state.wi.us/2003/data/AB998hst.html (last visited
Mar. 12, 2006), and warned the Wisconsin Legislature that they should "move on from this issue,
an issue it has lost twice to a veto and once to the Supreme Court." Press Release, Governor
Jim Doyle, Governor Doyle Vetoes AB998 (May 27, 2004), available at http://www.wisgov.state.
wi.us/joumal-media detail-print.asp?prid=564&lcid=19.
114. Mary Panzer sued in her personal capacity and in her official capacity as the Majority
Leader of the Wisconsin Senate. See Panzer,680 N.W.2d at 669. John Gard sued in his personal
capacity and in his official capacity as the Speaker of the Wisconsin Assembly. See id. Panzer
was an original action before the Wisconsin Supreme Court. See id. at 670. Accordingly, aside
from the political background of the case, there was no procedural history. See id.
115. Id.
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ner that avoid[ed] challenging the constitutionality of [that] statute...
'116
the validity of [the statute] permeates [the] case.
B.

The Court's Holdings and Rationale

Although the court's fundamental holding was that the governor
unlawfully exercised his authority under Section 14.035, the court first
embarked on the unraised issue of whether or not Section 14.035 is
constitutional.1 7 To avoid confusion of the various issues, and to understand the interplay between the explicit issues presented to the
court and the implicit issues that underlie the opinion, this section
breaks down the majority opinion into its analysis of Section 14.035
and then its analysis of the compact provisions.
1.

Section 14.035 Is Not Unconstitutional

As the court indicated, although the plaintiffs did not challenge the
facial validity of Section 14.035, that question nevertheless "permeates" the case.1 1 8 After all, if the court were to find that the statute
was in fact unconstitutional, the remaining issues would be rendered
moot. 1 9 The court found, however, that despite "the legislature's exceptionally broad delegation of power to the Governor ...[Section]
1 20
14.035 is not unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.
Central to that finding was the question of which branch of government possessed the authority to bind the state to gaming compacts
before Section 14.035 was enacted. 121 Relying upon cases from other
jurisdictions, the majority concluded that "committing the state to policy choices negotiated in gaming compacts constitutes a legislative
function.' 22 Therefore, absent Section 14.035, the court stated that
"the power to enter into compacts under IGRA would reside with
Wisconsin's legislative branch."' 23 The legislature, however, dele116. Id. at 686.
117. Panzer, 680 N.W.2d at 670, 687.
118. Id. at 686.
119. If the statute was unconstitutional, then, a fortiori, the governor's actions pursuant to
that statute would also be unconstitutional.
120. Panzer, 680 N.W.2d at 687.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 687-88. The court cited decisions interpreting Arizona, Kansas, New Mexico, New
York, and Rhode Island laws and noted that those courts had "concluded that entering into a
tribal-state compact under IGRA, thereby committing the state to a particular position with
respect to Indian gaming, involves subtle and important decisions regarding state policy that are
at the heart of legislative power." Id. at 687.
123. Id. at 688.
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gated that authority to the governor in Section 14.035. Accordingly,
124
the court next had to consider whether that delegation was lawful.
In order to answer that question, the majority turned to the state's
judicially developed "nondelegation doctrine," which generally permits one branch of government to delegate an area of authority to
another branch of government provided that it does not delegate too
much. 125 Under that doctrine, the court noted that their review considers "both the nature of delegated power and the presence of adequate procedural safeguards, giving less emphasis to the former when
the latter is present. 1 2 6 Drawing upon cases in which the legislature
delegated authority to an administrative agency, the court stated that
when the legislature delegates power to another body of government,
"it is incumbent on the legislature, pursuant to its constitutional grant
of legislative power, to maintain some legislative accountability over
rule-making. ' 127 Transporting that principle into its analysis of Section 14.035, the court declared that "it is crucial for the legislature to
preserve the right to exercise some degree of control over the dele'128
gated power.
With that groundwork laid, the court first noted that the statute "indisputably delegate[d] a broad and expansive power to the Governor," and then concluded that it did not "express clear policy
objectives or include explicit procedural safeguards. ' 129 Nevertheless,
the court reasoned that "[s]o long as the legislature retains the power
to act on Indian gaming, there are procedural safeguards to assure
that the governor acts 'within that legislative purpose." 130 Turning to
Section 14.035, the court found that procedural safeguards existed in
the following forms:
First, apart from the extraconstitutional techniques of leverage
and communication between branches, the legislature retains the
power to repeal [Section] 14.035 if it is able to muster enough votes
to override a gubernatorial veto. This blunt instrument could recapture the power delegated to the governor. Second, the legislature
may seek to amend [Section] 14.035 to require the ratification of
compact extensions or amendments, direct the governor to seek
specific terms, or express a desire to nonrenew. Finally, the legislature may appeal to public opinion. The governor of Wisconsin is a
124. See infra notes 125-133 and accompanying text.
125. Panzer, 680 N.W.2d at 684.
126. Id. at 685.
127. Id. at 686 (citing Martinez v. Dep't of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 478 N.W.2d 582
(Wis. 1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 688.
130. Id.
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highly visible public official and the governor's decisions on Indian
gaming will attract the attention of the public and the news media.
If the governor makes a policy choice that is unacceptable to
the
131
people, the governor will be held accountable to the people.
The court went on to say that "[i]n sum, although the statute is not a
model of legislative delegation, its purpose is ascertainable, and in
most situations there are safeguards available to alter the policy
choices made by the governor.' 32 Based on this rationale, the majority found Section 14.035 to be a constitutional delegation of
133
authority.
2.

The Doyle Amendments Are Invalid

Notwithstanding the fact that the court found Section 14.035 to be a
constitutional delegation of power, the court went on to find that each
of the contested provisions of the Doyle Amendments was the result
134
of an invalid exercise of that delegated power.
a.

The Duration Provision

The plaintiffs attacked the duration provision of the Doyle Amendments on the ground that "the Governor ha[d] neither inherent nor
delegated authority to agree to compact terms that place matters of
public policy and statecraft outside of the legislature's ability to influence.' 35 In their view, because the Doyle Amendments essentially
lasted in perpetuity, future legislatures and future governors would be
irrevocably bound to the compacts. 136 Doyle, however, responded
that the legislature, by enacting Section 14.035, intended to grant him
such broad authority. 137 Furthermore, the governor pointed to similar
agreements, such as interstate compacts, as an example of the State
binding itself indefinitely. 138 Beyond interstate compacts, the parties
agreed that Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Kansas, Minnesota, and
139
Mississippi all have similar provisions.
A majority of the court, however, rejected Doyle's arguments. Specifically, the majority dismissed the argument that the gaming compacts are similar to interstate compacts by simply stating "the fact that
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Panzer, 680 N.W.2d at 689.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 701.
Id. at 690.
Id.
Panzer, 680 N.W.2d at 690.
Id.
Id. at 691.

2006]

PANZER V. DOYLE

1359

a state may, under the federal constitution, bind itself to another state
as a matter of federal law, does not mean that a governor may bind
the state to a gaming compact with an Indian tribe indefinitely and
without notice to or approval by the legislature. ' 140 As for the other
jurisdictions with indefinite compacts, the majority noted that those
states lacked appellate decisions regarding such provisions, and without such decisions the court was "unable to speculate as to whether
these indefinite compacts comport with the law of their respective jurisdictions, much less Wisconsin."'141
In agreeing with the plaintiffs, the majority related the discussion
back to the nondelegation doctrine, saying that "[t]he concern is that
the Governor unexpectedly gave away power delegated to him so that
the legislature cannot take it back."'1 42 By doing so, the court reasoned, the governor circumvented the "implicit" procedural safeguards of Section 14.035.143 This is because "[t]he legislature would
be powerless" to influence any future compact negotiations because
the Doyle Amendments effectually preclude such negotiations. 144
Similarly, voters could not exercise their electoral influence on the
governor because they would be unable to elect a future governor
who could alter the already agreed upon compact terms. 145 Accordingly, the majority concluded that Section 14.035 did not grant the
governor the authority to agree to a gaming compact of indefinite duration because such a provision nullified the "implicit" procedural
safeguards that the majority found to sustain the statute's
constitutionality. 46
b. Expansion of Permissible Class III Gaming
The crux of the plaintiffs' argument against the provision within the
Doyle Amendments that expanded the scope of permissible gaming
activities was that the 1993 Constitutional Amendment prohibited any
governmental body, including the governor, from agreeing to new
games that are expressly prohibited by law. 147 In response, Doyle
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 690.
143. Panzer, 680 N.W.2d at 690-91.
144. Id. at 691.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 692.
147. Id. Originally, the plaintiffs expressly declined to take a position as to whether the legislature could agree to games prohibited by constitutional amendment. Id. at 692-93. The court,
however, requested additional briefs on the matter, and the parties eventually agreed that if the
state constitution made certain games off limits, it did not matter whether the governor or the
legislature was the decision-maker. Panzer, 680 N.W.2d at 692-93.
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contended that the state constitution did "not prevent him from entering into a compact for additional types of games.' 148 Rather, as Doyle
argued, state law provided only the basis for the compact negotiations-those games that he was required to negotiate-and he was
149
free to negotiate games beyond that minimum threshold.
Crucial to resolving this issue was a statutory interpretation of
IGRA. 150 In construing IGRA, the majority found American Greyhound Racing, Inc. v. Hull15 to be highly persuasive. 152 In that case,
an Arizona district court faced an argument similar to Doyle's and
concluded:
The court conceives this question as whether IGRA establishes a
ceiling for compact terms, or a floor. That is, whether IGRA permits states to offer only such games that are legal for any person for
any purpose (a ceiling), or whether IGRA requires states to offer
tribes terms equal to those granted their own citizens, plus allows
states to agree to any additional gaming (a floor). For the153reasons
that follow, the court believes a ceiling view is mandated.
Using American Greyhound as a springboard, the Panzer majority
turned to the statutory language of IGRA, which states that "class III
gaming activities shall be lawful on Indian lands only if such activities
are... located in a State that permits such gaming for any purpose by
any person, organization or entity."'1 54 According to the majority, this
language supports the conclusion reached by the court in American
Greyhound-thatthere are "two categories of Class III games: [tihose
over which a state must negotiate with a tribe and those that are illegal
to negotiate."'1 5 5 Under the statutory language, those games that the
state must negotiate over "are games permitted 'for any purpose by
any person, organization, or entity .... 111156 On the other hand, the

148. Id. at 693.
149. Id. at 693-94.
150. See id. at 693-94 n.35 (discussing a speech given by then Attorney General Doyle at the
Federal Indian Law Seminar relating to changes in state law subsequent to the implementation
of compacts).
151. Am. Greyhound Racing, Inc. v. Hull, 146 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1067-68 (D. Ariz. 2001),
vacated on other grounds, 305 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 2002).
152. Panzer, 680 N.W.2d at 694 (stating that the district court's analysis in American Greyhound is "persuasive").
153. Id. (citing American Greyhound, 146 F. Supp. 2d at 1067).
154. Id. at 695 (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(B) (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
155. Id.
156. Id. (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(B)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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majority determined, the state cannot negotiate over games that are
157
illegal in Wisconsin.
Therefore, the question turned upon whether Wisconsin law permitted the new games compacted for under the Doyle Amendmentsnamely, keno, roulette, craps, and poker. 158 After reviewing the history of the prohibitions on gambling in Wisconsin, the court concluded that "[b]lackjack and other varieties of banking card games,
poker, roulette, craps, keno and slot machines are all games specifi' 159
cally outside the scope of [the 1993 Constitutional Amendment].'
In other words, the 1993 Constitutional Amendment (coupled with
Section 945) exemplifies the state's public policy against gambling in
general and the expressly prohibited games in particular. 160 Accordingly, the majority held that "the Governor's agreement to the additional games of keno, roulette, craps, and poker in 2003 was contrary
to criminal/prohibitory sections of state law in addition to the
constitution. 161
C. Dissenting Opinion

The three dissenting justices began their opinion with the ominous
summation that "All Bets are Off."'1 62 Thereafter, the dissent found
that both Section 14.035 and the governor's actions pursuant to that
statute were constitutional. 163 Accordingly, the dissent concluded that
each of the compact provisions that the majority struck down was
valid.

164

The dissent agreed with the majority that Section 14.035 is constitutional. 165 They took issue, however, with the majority's reading of
"implicit limits" into the statute. 166 In particular, the dissent found no
"implicit" limits on the governor's wholly valid authority under Section 14.035.167 Rather, the governor's authority is expressly limited
157. Id. at 696 (stating that "the continued vitality of Lac du Flambeau's holding is very
doubtful, and the decision's statements regarding Wisconsin's policy toward gaming have been
seriously undercut by the 1993 [Constitutional] Amendment").
158. Panzer, 680 N.W.2d at 695-97.
159. Id. at 696.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 697.
162. See id. at 701 (Abrahamson, C.J., joined by Bradley, J., and Crooks, J., dissenting).
163. See infra notes 165-179 and accompanying text.
164. See infra notes 165-179 and accompanying text.
165. Panzer, 680 N.W.2d at 707 (Abrahamson, C.J., joined by Bradley, J., and Crooks, J.,
dissenting).
166. Id. at 707-09. The dissent stated in poetic fashion: "[i]t is not clear from whence cometh
these 'implicit limits'...." Id. at 708.
167. Id. at 709.
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only by IGRA, which Section 14.035 explicitly incorporates. 168 Using
those premises, the dissent tackled the compact provisions.
According to the dissent, the duration provision is valid because it
will not last in perpetuity-instead it provides for gaming regulation
amendments every five years, and the parties can amend "any provision of the compact every twenty-five years."'1 69 Furthermore, the dissent argued that the Doyle Amendments "actually place the
legislature in a better position" than the original compacts because
after twenty-five years, the legislature can enact a law that directs the
governor to propose an amendment to the compact. 170
Similarly, the dissent concluded that the provision which expanded
the additional scope of permitted gaming was also valid.1 7 1 In analyzing the validity of the additional games provision, the dissent's focal
point was that the Original Compact expressly states: "To the extent
that State law or Tribal ordinances, or any amendments thereto, are
inconsistent with any provision of this Compact, this Compact shall
control. '172 The dissent read this language as the parties clear "intent
to be bound by the" law as it existed in 1992.173 Based on this conclusion, the pertinent question did not become what games could the
governor negotiate over in 2003, but rather what games could the governor negotiate over in 1992.174 To answer this question, the dissent
turned to the controlling judicial opinion of that time, Lac du
Flambeau.175 In that case, a federal district court, applying the
Cabazon criminal/prohibitory-civil/regulatory analysis, determined
that the state must negotiate with the tribe over any games. 176 Accordingly, the governor was well within his rights when he compacted
177
for additional forms of gaming.
Furthermore, the dissent argued that despite the fact that the law in
Wisconsin changed in regards to gambling, the compact was not affected due to the impairment of contracts clauses in the Wisconsin and
168. Id.
169. Id. at 715.
170. Panzer, 680 N.W.2d at 716 (Abrahamson, C.J., joined by Bradley, J., and Crooks, J.,
dissenting).
171. Id. at 718.
172. Id. (quoting Original Compact) (internal quotation marks omitted).
173. Id.
174. Id. at 718-19.
175. Id. at 718.
176. Panzer, 680 N.W.2d at 718-19 (Abrahamson, C.J., joined by Bradley, J., and Crooks, J.,
dissenting) (citing Lac du Flambeau Band of Chippewa Indians v. Wisconsin, 770 F. Supp. 480,
488 (W.D. Wis. 1991)).
177. See id. at 722.
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United States Constitutions. 178 After applying a lengthy impairment
of contracts analysis, the dissent stated: "[T]he majority's application
of the 1993 [C]onstitutional [A]mendment substantially impairs the
contractual relationship and ...[therefore] we conclude that the ma1 79
jority's decision violates the impairment of contracts clause."'

IV.

ANALYSIS

The Panzer opinion is complex, and unfortunately from a legal perspective, the political undertones make it difficult to flesh out the issues. Careful analysis, however, shows that the majority opinion was
founded upon the invalid premise that Section 14.035's constitutionality is sustained by implicit procedural safeguards. 180 This invalid premise infiltrates the majority's discussion of the duration provision,
thus creating an inherent flaw in that analysis.' 8 ' Lastly, the majority
misconstrues IGRA by concluding that the state may only compact
182
over games that are expressly legal.
A.

The Majority Improperly Read "Implicit" Procedural
Safeguards Into Section 14.035

In order to save the constitutionality of Section 14.035, the majority
wrongly read implicit limits into the statute. These limits are supported by neither case law nor the statute itself. 183 According to the
majority, Section 14.035 did not violate separation of powers principles because certain implicit procedural safeguards exist to sustain the
constitutionality of the statute. 184 In reaching the conclusion that the
statute was constitutional, the majority worked under the assumption
that the fundamental power to enter into gaming compacts under
IGRA was a power vested in the legislature. 8 5 The dissent agreed
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Id. at 724.
Id.
See infra notes 183-219 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 220-231 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 232-282 and accompanying text.

183. This author recognizes that by finding Section 14.035 unconstitutional, the court would

severely undermine the legitimacy of the original 1992 compacts because those compacts would
have been executed pursuant to an unconstitutional delegation of power. As will be argued later

in this Note, this would have serious ramifications for Indian gaming because of Dairyland. See
infra notes 220-231 and accompanying text. Assuming that neither the majority nor the dissent
want to abolish Indian gaming in Wisconsin, it seems that both would be willing to find the
statute constitutional at all costs.

184. Panzer, 680 N.W.2d 666 at 689.
185. Id. at 688 (concluding that "in the absence of Section 14.035, the power to enter into
compacts under IGRA would reside with Wisconsin's legislative branch"). This Note does not

address whether this is a valid assumption. It is worthwhile to note, however, that IGRA is
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with the majority. 186 The majority, however, viewed the constitution-

ality of the statute through the lens of the "nondelegation doctrine. ' 187

Under that doctrine, the legislature can delegate its

legislative function to another branch of government provided procedural safeguards exist such that the legislature "maintain[s]some ac1 88
countability over rule-making."'

As applied to Section 14.035, the majority found three implicit safe-

guards. 189 First, the legislature can repeal the law if it can garner
"enough votes to override a gubernatorial veto."' 9 Second, the legislature could amend the law to require legislative approval.' 9' Third,
the legislature may appeal to the public, who in turn can hold the

governor accountable for any ill-advised policy choices he or she may

make. 192 Besides the fact that the majority cited no precedent for this

form of statutory interpretation (i.e., reading implicit limits into the
statute), a common-sense analysis of these "safeguards" shows that
they do not in fact permit the legislature to "maintain some legislative
accountability over rule-making" because such safeguards exist in al-

most any law. 193 Furthermore, the fact that the legislature could resilent as to whether compacting is a legislative or executive function (or both). See 25 U.S.C.
§ 2701 (2000).
186. Panzer, 680 N.W.2d at 714 (Abrahamson, C.J., joined by Bradley, J., and Crooks, J.,
dissenting) (stating that "we conclude that Wis Stat §14.035 constitutes a valid delegation of
authority to the governor"). Although not explicitly stating that the power to bind the state to
compacts with tribes inheres in the legislature, the dissent's conclusion that the statute validly
delegates that power to the governor acts as an admission to this point.
187. Id. at 684 (majority opinion).
188. Id. at 686 (quoting Martinez v. Dep't of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 478 N.W.2d
582, 587 (Wis. 1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
189. Id. at 689.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Panzer, 680 N.W.2d at 689.
193. Id. at 686 (quoting Martinez, 478 N.W.2d at 587) (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted). For example, common sense tells us that the fact that the legislature may repeal
the statute provides no support for the proposition that it has retained "some power to act on
Indian gaming" under the statute. Likewise, the fact that it can amend the law does not support
the conclusion that the legislature has the power under the current law to act on Indian gaming.
Rather, both perceived "safeguards" support the conclusion that the legislature cannot act at all
pursuant to Section 14.035. The "public opinion" safeguard suffers a similar shortcoming because it evinces the fact that the legislature has not retained any control over gaming; in order to
influence the governor, the legislature must turn to the general public to exert its political influence. Again, notwithstanding the fact that the legislature can appeal to public opinion to sway
the governor's policy choices, it is not necessarily true that the legislature has maintained accountability over rule-making. In sum, common sense dictates that none of these three "implicit
procedural safeguards" gives the legislature the power to act on gaming under the current statute. By reading these implicit safeguards into the statute, the majority went beyond most methods of statutory interpretation, which generally look at the text and legislative history of the
statute. See generally ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS
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peal or amend Section 14.035 does not mean that it may unravel
events that have already occurred; such action could only affect future
compact negotiations. Similarly, appealing to public opinion would
not protect the legislature because the public can only hold the governor accountable by voting him or her out of office.
The majority also fallaciously applied separation of powers principles to determine that Section 14.035 was constitutional. At the outset
of its analysis, the majority examined only two cases regarding legislative delegation of power to another government entity.194 The first
case, Gilbert v. Medical Examining Board,19 5 "addressed the issue of
whether the legislature had delegated too much power to an executive
branch agency."'1 96 In that case, the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld
a statute that delegated authority to the Medical Examining Board to:
"investigate allegations of unprofessional conduct" by licensed medics; conduct hearings regarding such allegations; and ultimately take
action as the board deemed necessary. 197 In so holding, the court
emphasized:
[T]here are intrinsic safeguards within the procedure the Board itself must follow upon receiving an allegation of unprofessional conduct. The Board must first investigate the allegation and, upon a
finding of probable cause to believe that a person is guilty of such
conduct, conduct a hearing before the Board prior to any action
which may be taken concerning reprimand, suspension, etc. Thus,
due process requirements are met.... Further, the Board is empowered to adopt rules concerning the procedures it will follow for such
investigations and hearings pursuant to ch. 227, Stats. This court
has already noted that a delegation of rule-making authority which
is attended by the safeguards under ch. 227, Stats., requiring public
hearings and the opportunity for the198challenge of its rules in court,
is a sufficient procedural safeguard.
Based on those procedural safeguards, the court concluded that the
statute was a valid delegation of power. 199 After Gilbert, the Panzer
court went on to discuss Martinez v. Department of Industry, Labor &
Human Relations,20 0 which held that the legislature retained the right
to review rules promulgated by an administrative agency when that
LAw (1997), for a thorough discussion of the competing principles regarding statutory
interpretation.
194. Panzer, 680 N.W.2d at 685-86.
195. Gilbert v. Med. Examining Bd., 349 N.W.2d 68 (Wis. 1984).
196. See Panzer, 680 N.W.2d at 685 (discussing Gilbert, 349 N.W.2d 68).
197. Gilbert, 349 N.W.2d at 78.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 84.
200. Martinez v. Dep't of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 478 N.W.2d 582 (Wis. 1992).
AND THE
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agency was acting pursuant to a legislative grant of authority. 20 1 In
reaching that conclusion, the court noted that "[liegislative power may
be delegated to an administrative agency as long as adequate stan20 2
dards for conducting the allocated power are in place.
Noticeably missing from the majority's analysis were State ex rel Attorney General (Tavern Code Authority)20 3 and State ex rel Attorney
General v. Wisconsin Constructors (Wisconsin Constructors),204 two
cases that addressed the issue of whether the legislature can delegate
legislative authority directly to the governor. 20 5 In Tavern Code Authority, the Wisconsin Supreme Court considered whether the legislature properly granted authority to the governor "to investigate,
ascertain, declare and prescribe reasonable codes or standards of fair
competition and trade practices . . . ,"206 The statute in question also
required that the governor declare such codes only after reasonable
public notice, and furthermore, only if such codes were "not designed
to promote monopolies or to eliminate or oppress small enterprises
[and] ... not inequitable and that the interests of the consumer and
the general public will be protected . . . [and] . . . necessary for the
stabilization of the [particular business or industry]." 20 7 En route to
concluding that this statute was in fact constitutional, the court reasoned that the law's detailed requirements provided "the requisite and
necessary standard to guide the Governor in the exercise of the power
'20 8
conferred upon him.
In a companion case, Wisconsin Constructors, the Wisconsin Supreme Court examined the validity of a different section of the same
statute. 20 9 The specific section in question permitted the governor to
collect "assessments sufficient to reimburse the state for the expenses
incurred by it in connection with the initial promulgation of the code
[and] ... expenses incurred by any code authority or administrative
agency .... "210 Similar to the Tavern Code Authority opinion, the
court in Wisconsin Constructors concluded that the language of the
statute provided a "sufficient legislative standard ... for the Gover-

nor's guidance
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

....

",211

Id. at 587.
Id. at 585.
State ex rel. Attorney General (Tavern Code Authority), 264 N.W. 633 (Wis. 1936).
State ex rel. Attorney General v. Wisconsin Constructors, 268 N.W. 238 (Wis. 1936).
See infra notes 206-211 and accompanying text.
Tavern Code Authority, 264 N.W. at 635 n.1 (citing Wis. STAT. § 110 (1935)).
Id.
Id. at 638.
Wisconsin Constructors, 268 N.W. at 240.
Id. (citing Wis. STAT. § 110.08 (1935)).
Id. at 242.
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Based on these two cases, it becomes evident that the legislature
can delegate authority to the governor, but that delegation must be
accompanied by sufficient standards to guide the governor's actions. 2 12 Coupling the "sufficient standards" rationale with the "procedural safeguards" required in legislative delegations to
administrative agencies, it is evident that the empowering statute must
contain some explicit safeguards that curtail or guide the governor's
exercise of authority pursuant to that delegation. 2 13 Section 14.035
contains such explicit safeguards and guidance by expressly incorporating IGRA into the statute. 214 As the statute clearly states: "The
governor may, on behalf of this state, enter into any compact that has
been negotiated under 25 U.S.C. 2710(d). ' 21 5 Accordingly, while the
governor has been delegated broad authority under Section 14.035,
that authority is expressly limited by the comprehensive scheme set
21 6
forth in IGRA relating to compacts.
The majority, however, chose to ignore the explicit safeguards con21 7
tained in Section 14.035 in favor of implicit procedural safeguards.
Its action is unsupported by the case law and contravenes conventional statutory interpretation. 21 8 Furthermore, by incorporating the
implicit procedural safeguards into the statute, the majority created an
2 19
invalid premise for its analysis of the duration provision.
B.

The Majority's Analysis of the Duration Provision
Creates a CircularArgument

The majority's conclusion that the duration provision is invalid because it circumvents the implicit procedural safeguards is supported
212. See Tavern Code Authority, 264 N.W. at 642 (upholding statute that delegated legislative
power to the governor because statute set forth sufficient standards to guide his exercise of
power); see also Wisconsin Constructors, 268 N.W. at 242 (holding that legislative grant of authority to governor was valid because statute contained "sufficient legislative standard[s] ... for
the Governor's guidance").
213. See Gilbert v. Med. Examining Bd., 349 N.W.2d 68, 78 (Wis. 1984); see also Tavern Code
Authority, 264 N.W. at 638.
214. See Wis. STAT. § 14.035 (2003).
215. Id.
216. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d) (2000). IGRA sets forth a highly complex scheme which provides for the manner in which Class III gaming can be operated. One requirement is that Class
III gaming be conducted through a compact between the state and the tribe, and IGRA sets
forth lengthy requirements regarding how the compact can be negotiated and what may be included in it. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A)-(C).
217. See supra notes 183-192 and accompanying text.
218. See supra notes 193-216 and accompanying text.
219. See infra notes 220-231 and accompanying text.
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by no authority and it ultimately creates a circular argument. 22 0 In
this case, the majority concluded that the "legislature ha[d] not delegated to the Governor the authority to agree to a duration provision
that circumvents the procedural safeguards that sustain the legislature's ability to delegate that power in the first place. '221 The initial
problem with this conclusion is that the majority failed to cite any

authority to support

it.222

Rather, the majority simply came to the

bald conclusion that the legislature must not have intended to delegate such broad authority to the governor, despite the fact that when
the legislature ratified Section 14.035, it specifically rejected amendments that would have required legislative oversight of gaming
22 3
compacts.
Beyond the fact that the majority cited no authority, its reasoning
and conclusion contain an inherent logical flaw-they create a circular
argument. As the majority indicates, Section 14.035 is a very broad
delegation of power to the governor. 224 Assuming that the duration
provision does allow the compact to endure indefinitely, the majority
cannot logically maintain that the statute is constitutional but the duration provision is invalid. To overcome that obstacle, the majority
engages in circular reasoning.
Looking to their reasoning, the majority stated: "[T]he concern is
that the Governor unexpectedly gave away power delegated to him so
that the legislature cannot take it back. This action circumvents the
procedural safeguards that insure that delegated power may be curtailed or reclaimed by future legislative action. ' 225 Under this reasoning, the majority's premise-"that the Governor unexpectedly gave
away power delegated to him so that the legislature cannot take it
back"-was the same as its conclusion-that such "action circumvents
the procedural safeguards that insure that delegated power may be
curtailed or reclaimed by future legislative action. '226 Stated another
way, the majority argued that the governor circumvented the procedural safeguards and therefore circumvented the procedural safeguards.
220. See infra notes 221-231 and accompanying text. This Note does not attempt to address
the wisdom of the duration provision contained in the Doyle Amendments. As a practical observation, however, it seems logical (and perhaps preferable) that the governor, on behalf of the
state, would want to retain some power to renegotiate or terminate the compact in the future.
221. Panzer v. Doyle, 680 N.W.2d 666, 692 (Wis. 2004).
222. See id. at 689-92.
223. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
224. As the majority stated: "[Section] 14.035 indisputably delegates a broad and expansive
power to the Governor." Panzer, 680 N.W.2d at 688.
225. Id. at 690.
226. Id.
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As this demonstrates, the majority's premise contains its conclusiona circular argument.
This circularity provides further support for the argument that the
majority improperly read implicit procedural safeguards into Section
14.035 instead of recognizing the statute's reference to IGRA as an
explicit procedural safeguard. 227 Had the majority recognized the statute's explicit procedural safeguards, then it would have been compelled to reach the conclusion that the duration provision was in fact
valid because IGRA does not limit the duration of compacts. 22 8 Specifically, IGRA contains extensive guidelines as to how the state and
tribes may go about the compacting process and furthermore what
may be included in a compact.2 29 It is important to note that IGRA
neither limits nor proscribes the permissible duration of the compacts.2 30 Because IGRA is the vehicle by which Indian gaming can
legally operate, its silence as to the permissible length of the compacts
is strong evidence that the duration provision within the Doyle
231
Amendments is valid (although perhaps not wise).
C.

The Majority Misinterpreted IGRA and Consequently Rendered
the Compacting Process Meaningless

Next, the majority leapt to the realm of federal law-namely,
IGRA-to conclude that the Governor cannot agree to a compact
provision that expands the permissible scope of Class III gaming in
Wisconsin. 232 In doing so, the majority misconstrued IGRA to determine that the Governor had authority only to negotiate over games
that are explicitly permitted by Wisconsin law. 233 This conclusion is
unfounded because IGRA, by way of incorporating the Supreme
Court's analysis in Cabazon, requires a court to look at whether the
state has embodied a regulatory approach to all forms of gambling, as
opposed to a prohibitory approach to all forms of gambling.2 3 4 Under
227. See supra notes 214-216 and accompanying text.
228. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3) (2000) (outlining the compacting process and what may be
included in a gaming compact).
229. Id. § 2710(d)(3)(C)(i)-(vii) (outlining provisions that may be included in a gaming
compact).
230. See generally id. § 2710(d).
231. See id. § 2702 (indicating that two purposes of IGRA are to "provide a statutory basis for
the operation of gaming by Indian tribes... [and] a statutory basis for the regulation of gaming
by an Indian tribe").
232. Panzer v. Doyle, 680 N.W.2d 666, 696 (Wis. 2004).
233. See supra notes 147-161 and accompanying text.
234. See generally supra notes 26-37 and accompanying text.
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a Cabazon analysis, Wisconsin clearly regulates gambling; the Gover2 35
nor had the authority to negotiate over any type of Class III games.
In Panzer, the majority misinterpreted IGRA by concluding that
the Governor was without authority to negotiate over additional
forms of Class III gaming.2 36 With respect to the specific provision in
the Doyle Amendments, the majority concluded: "The new casinostyle games that the Governor agreed to in 2003 are expressly forbid-

den by statute. Thus, the Governor was without authority to agree, on
behalf of the state, to add variations on blackjack, electronic keno,

roulette, craps, poker and other non-house banked card games under
the [Doyle Amendments]."

237

Central to this conclusion was a statu-

238
tory interpretation of IGRA.

The pertinent provision of IGRA states that Class III gaming activities shall be lawfully conducted on Indian lands only if such activities

are "located in a State that permits such gaming for any purpose by
any person, organization, or entity .... ,239 According to the majority,
this statutory language means that the State must explicitly permit
each specific form of Class III gaming before any tribe can conduct
that particular form of gaming. 240 As the majority described, this interpretation corresponds to the "ceiling" view of IGRA, which means

that the state may negotiate only over gaming that is explicitly permitted by state law. 2 41 In support of this conclusion, the majority relied
on American Greyhound, Rumsey Indian Rancheria of Wintun Indians
24 3
v. Wilson,242 and Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota.
These three cases all reached a conclusion that is consistent with the

majority's analysis.2 44 The Rumsey court succinctly stated that conclusion as follows:

235. See infra notes 251-259 and accompanying text.
236. See Panzer, 680 N.W.2d at 697.
237. Id.
238. See id. at 695 (noting that the "ultimate inquiry focuses on the 'permits such gaming'
language in [IGRA]").
239. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(B) (2000).
240. See Panzer, 680 N.W.2d at 694 (citing Am. Greyhound Racing, Inc. v. Hull, 146 F. Supp.
2d 1012, 1067-68 (D. Ariz. 2001)). As the Panzer majority stated, the "District Court in American Greyhound concluded that IGRA does not permit a state to enter into compacts authorizing
tribes to engage in gaming otherwise prohibited by state law." Id.
241. Id. at 695.
242. Rumsey Indian Rancheria of Wintun Indians v. Wilson, 64 F.3d 1250 (9th Cir. 1994).
243. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, 3 F.3d 273 (8th Cir. 1993).
244. See Rumsey Indian Rancheria, 64 F.3d at 1258; see also Cheyenne River Sioux, 3 F.3d at
279 ("The 'such gaming' language of 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(B) does not require the state to
negotiate with respect to forms of gaming it does not presently permit."); American Greyhound,
146 F. Supp. 2d at 1067 (concluding that under § 2710(d)(1) "a compact cannot make legal
[C]lass III gaming not otherwise permitted by state law.... Federal courts have adopted what
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IGRA does not require a state to negotiate over one form of Class
III gaming activity simply because it has legalized another, albeit
similar form of gaming. Instead, the statute says only that, if a state
allows a gaming activity "for any purpose by any person, organization, or entity," then it also must allow Indian tribes to engage in
that same activity.... In other words, a state need only allow Indian
tribes to operate games that others
can operate, but need not give
24 5
tribes what others cannot have.
Fundamental to this rationale is the premise that IGRA superseded
the Cabazon criminal/prohibitory-civil/regulatory analysis such that it
no longer applies. 246 In Panzer, the court concluded that the 1993
Constitutional Amendment rendered all forms of gambling illegal if
they were not explicitly permitted by law. 247 Therefore, in the majority's view, the Governor could compact over expressly permitted
games only and no more.2 48 No one denies, however, that the lottery,
bingo, raffles, and pari-mutuel on-track betting are permitted in
Wisconsin.

249

The majority went on to state that "[u]ntil very recently, the Lac du
Flambeau was the only case concluding that, once a state regulates
one form of Class III gaming, the state must negotiate over all forms
of Class III gaming. '250 The court then, in an off-handed manner, dismissed the recent Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals case (the federal
circuit in which Wisconsin is located), Lac Courte Oreilles Band of
Lake Superior Chippewa Indians of Wisconsin v. United States (Lac
Courte Oreilles),25 1 which follows the decision in Lac du Flambeau.2 52
the court shall call a 'ceiling' perspective, holding that [IGRA] requires compact games to be
lawful under state law.").
245. Rumsey Indian Rancheria, 64 F.3d at 1258 (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(B) (2000))
(internal citations omitted).
246. See Panzer, 680 N.W.2d 666 at 695 n.36. In a footnote, the majority asserted:
As we see it, Cabazon interpreted the effect of [Public Law 280] on Indian gaming:
IGRA superseded both [Public Law 280] and Cabazon when it prescribed in detail the
states' role in Indian gaming. Putting to one side the constitutional protections against
the impairment of contracts, we do not understand IGRA to grant Indian tribes in
Wisconsin the right to engage in gambling activities that are prohibited by the Wisconsin constitution and Wisconsin criminal statutes to all persons, organizations, and entities in the state.
Id.
247. Id. at 696.
248. See id. at 696-97.
249. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
250. Panzer, 680 N.W.2d at 695.
251. Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. United States, 367 F.3d
650 (7th Cir. 2004).
252. See Panzer, 680 N.W.2d at 695 n.36 (indicating that the Seventh Circuit's application of
the Lac du Flambeau case was merely dicta).
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In Lac Courte Oreilles, numerous Wisconsin tribes brought suit
challenging the constitutionality of a provision of IGRA requiring gu25 3
bernatorial concurrence for gaming on newly acquired tribal lands.
In upholding the constitutionality of the statute, the court conducted a
rather extensive discussion of IGRA, its relationship to Cabazon, and
Wisconsin gambling policy. 254 Specifically, the court noted that pursuant to the 1993 Constitutional Amendment, "casino gambling is not
permitted under Wisconsin law. '255 Nevertheless, the court went on
to state that "[t]he establishment of a state lottery signals Wisconsin's
broader public policy of tolerating gaming on Indian lands. ' 256 In doing so, the court read Cabazon in conjunction with IGRA to conclude
that "the lottery's continued existence demonstrates Wisconsin's amenability to Indian gaming. ' 257 Furthermore, in a direct application of
the rationale employed in Cabazon, the court took notice of the fact
that "Wisconsin has not been willing to sacrifice its lucrative lottery
and to criminalize all gambling in order to obtain authority under
Cabazon and § 2710(d)(1)(b) to prohibit gambling on Indian lands
.... 258 Given this language, it appears that the Seventh Circuit considers the Cabazon rationale to be directly incorporated into
2 59
IGRA.
Furthermore, the Second Circuit has expressly adopted the rationale employed in Lac du Flambeau.260 In the seminal case in that
circuit, Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Connecticut,261 the Second Circuit directly incorporated the Cabazon analysis into its statutory interpretation of IGRA. 262 Specifically, the court stated: "[W]e
accordingly conclude that the district court was correct in applying the
Cabazon criminal/prohibitory-civil/regulatory test to [C]lass III gaming." 26 3 Upon applying the Cabazon test, the court next concluded
"that Connecticut 'permits games of chance, albeit in a highly regu253. Lac Courte Oreilles, 367 F.3d at 654.
254. Id. at 664-65.
255. Id. at 664.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id. (emphasis added).
259. The Panzer majority was correct when it stated that this language was merely dicta;
given, however, the appellate court's extensive analysis, it is very persuasive authority as to the
proper law in the Seventh Circuit.
260. See Northern Arapaho Tribe v. Wyoming, 389 F.3d 1308, 1311 (10th Cir. 2004) (noting
that the Second Circuit has adopted the "categorical approach" or "Wisconsin" analysis as set
forth in Lac du Flambeau).
261. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Connecticut, 913 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499
U.S. 975 (1991).
262. Id. at 1031.
263. Id.

2006]

PANZER V. DOYLE

1373

lated form. Thus, such gaming is not totally repugnant to the State's
public policy.' ' 2 64 Accordingly, it does not appear that the Panzer
265
majority's IGRA analysis is accepted in all jurisdictions.
Although the Supreme Court has not construed IGRA, it appears
that the Seventh and Second Circuits are correct that IGRA incorporates the Cabazon rationale. 266 For example, in enacting IGRA, Congress found that "Indian tribes have the exclusive right to regulate
gaming activity on Indian lands if the gaming activity is not specifically
prohibited by Federal law and is conducted within a State which does
not, as a matter of criminal law and public policy, prohibit such gaming activity. '267 This language directly coincides with the Supreme
Court's language in Cabazon,268 in which the Court stated:
[I]f the intent of a state law is generally to prohibit certain conduct,
it falls within [Public Law] 280's grant of criminal jurisdiction, but if
the state law generally permits the conduct at issue, subject to regulation, it must be classified as civil/regulatory and [Public Law]
280
26 9
does not authorize its enforcement on an Indian reservation.
The Cabazon test later resurfaces in IGRA under the section relating
to the scope of permissible gaming. That section states: "Class III
gaming activities shall be lawful on Indian lands only if such activities
are . . . (B) located in a State that permits such gaming for any purpose by any person, organization, or entity .... "270 It is important to
keep in mind that Class III gaming is defined as "all forms of gambling
that are not [C]lass I gaming or [C]lass II gaming. '27 1 Engrafting the
definition of Class III gaming into the pertinent statutory section
reads: "JAll forms of gambling that are not Class I gaming or Class II
gaming] shall be lawful on Indian lands only if such activities are...
(B) located in a State that permits such gaming for any purpose by any
person, organization, or entity .... "272 This appears to be another
264. Id.
265. See Northern Arapaho Tribe, 389 F.3d at 1310-11 (observing that the interpretation of
§ 2710(d)(1)(B) "has spawned at least two different approaches regarding the scope of negotiations required between tribes and states under IGRA"); see also Steve J. Coleman, Note, Lottery
Logistics: The Potential Impact of a State Lottery on Indian Gaming in Oklahoma, 27 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 515 (2003) (discussing the varying approaches taken by the circuits that have addressed the issue).
266. See supra notes 253-264 and accompanying text.
267. 25 U.S.C. § 2701(5) (2000).
268. See Amy Head, Comment, The Death of the New Buffalo: The Fifth Circuit Slays Indian
Gaming in Texas, 34 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 377, 391-95 (2003) (arguing that this language evinces
the fact that "Congress intended the Cabazon rationale to apply to IGRA").
269. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 209 (1987).
270. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1).
271. Id. § 2703(8).
272. See id. § 2710(d)(1).
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explicit importation of the Cabazon substantive test, in that if the state
permits Class III gaming for any purpose, then "all forms of gambling
that are not [C]lass I gambling or [C]lass II gambling" shall be lawful
273
on Indian lands.
Moreover, if the majority is correct that the state is required to negotiate only over games that the state expressly permits, then, in the
words of the Second Circuit, "[t]he compact process that Congress established as the centerpiece of the IGRA's regulation of [C]lass III
gaming would thus become a dead letter; there would be nothing to
negotiate, and no meaningful compact would be possible. '274 Judge
Canby, in his dissent to a denial of a rehearing en banc in Rumsey,
echoed the Second Circuit's fears. 275 According to Judge Canby, the
Rumsey decision as it stands "frustrate[s] the scheme of state-tribal
negotiations that Congress established in IGRA," and that the "ruling
effectively frustrates IGRA's entire plan governing Class III Indian
gaming. ' 276 From a common-sense standpoint, the Second Circuit
and Judge Canby are correct by recognizing that if the state is required to negotiate only over games that are legal within the state,
then the compact would be meaningless because tribes, like any other
person or group, can conduct any legal gaming without the protection
of a compact under IGRA.
In summary, because IGRA incorporates the Cabazon test, the
proper analysis is whether the state regulates gambling or prohibits it
all together; it is not whether specific forms of gaming violate certain
provisions of state law. 277 In Wisconsin, it is clear that the state
merely regulates gambling. 27 8 In fact, the state constitution explicitly
permits pari-mutuel on-track betting and lotteries. 279 Although the
majority hangs its hat on the "prohibitory" language of the state constitution, the fact remains that various forms of gambling are permitted in Wisconsin. In Cabazon, the Supreme Court stated that this was
280
enough to render gambling laws unenforceable on Indian lands.
273. See Head, supra note 268, at 391-95.
274. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Connecticut, 913 F.2d 1024, 1031 (2d Cir. 1990); see also
Coleman, supra note 265, at 533-35 (discussing Judge Canby's dissent from the majority's denial
of an en banc rehearing in Rumsey Indian Rancheria).
275. Rumsey Indian Rancheria of Winturn Indians v. Wilson, 64 F.3d 1250, 1253 (9th Cir.
1994) (Canby, J., dissenting) (stating that "[t]he Second Circuit's fears of turning IGRA's compact process into a dead letter are well-founded").
276. Id.
277. Sullivan, supra note 23, at 1126.
278. See Panzer v. Doyle, 680 N.W.2d 666, 721 (Wis. 2004); see also Lac Courte Oreilles Band
of Lake Chippewa Indians v. United States, 367 F.3d 650, 664 (7th Cir. 2004).
279. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
280. See California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 209-10 (1987).
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Furthermore, applying the Cabazon rationale to IGRA comports with
common sense because otherwise the compact is rendered a "dead
letter. ' 281 Therefore, the majority was wrong when it construed
IGRA as permitting the governor to negotiate only over games that
282
are expressly legal in Wisconsin.
V.

IMPACT

From a legal perspective, Panzer has many ramifications-most of
which are not promising for Wisconsin's tribes. First and foremost,
the Panzer decision will undoubtedly play an important role in the
court's Dairyland decision, and the impact of Panzer will be contingent upon how the court decides Dairyland.83 Nevertheless, assum-

ing that the Wisconsin Supreme Court will be unwilling to abolish
Indian gaming in Wisconsin, the Panzer decision will continue to af2 84
fect the compacting process.
A.

The Panzer Fallout and the New Compact Amendments

Before discussing what effect Panzer will have in the long run, one

must know the immediate reaction to the decision. Specifically, on
October 4, 2005, shortly after being dealt the blow of Panzer, Doyle
and the Potawatomi agreed to new compact amendments (Post-Panzer
Amendments). 285 Despite the Panzer decision, the Post-Panzer

Amendments called for a twenty-five year duration provision that au-

28 6
tomatically renewed unless one party served notice of nonrenewal.

Additionally, in order for the state to serve notice of nonrenewal, the
legislature must first pass a statute directing the governor to serve the
notice; the governor could ostensibly veto such a bill. 287 Furthermore,
the Post-PanzerAmendments implicitly permit the continuation of the
same Class III gaming that the Wisconsin Supreme Court deemed ille281. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Connecticut, 913 F.2d 1024, 1031 (2d Cir. 1990).
282. See supra notes 147-161 and accompanying text.
283. See infra notes 290-312 and accompanying text.
284. See infra notes 313-327 and accompanying text.
285. See 2005 Amendment to the Forest County Potawatomi Community of Wisconsin and
the State of Wisconsin Gaming Compact of 1992, as amended, Oct. 4, 2005 [hereinafter PostPanzer Amendments], available at http://www.doa.state.wi.us/docs-view2.asp?docid=5275.
286. See id. 7(A)-(B) (amending section XXV of the Original Compact) (stating that "[tihe
Compact shall be extended for a term of 25 years from the date notification of this 2005 Amendment" and "shall be extended automatically . . . unless either party serves a notice of
nonrenewal").
287. See id. I 7(B)(1)(a) (stating that "[tihe Governor shall serve a notice of nonrenewal...
only if the State first enacts a statute directing the Governor to serve a notice of nonrenewal");
see also James J. Wawrzyn, Note, Panzer v. Doyle: Wisconsin ConstitutionalLaw Deals the Governor a New Hand, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 222, 236 (2005).
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gal in Panzer.288 At the same time, the Potawatomi agreed to pay
$43.625 million to the state in 2005, and between 6.5% and 8% of
their Milwaukee casino's net win for each year thereafter until the
compact expires in 2035.289
B.

The Majority Decision Places the Future of Indian Gaming
in Wisconsin in Jeopardy

While the Panzer decision was a severe blow to the Wisconsin

tribes, greater trouble looms for the tribes on the legal horizon-those
involved in the Dairyland litigation. 2 90 Unlike Panzer, which did not

raise the fundamental issue of whether Indian tribes can conduct gaming operations at all in the State of Wisconsin, Dairyland raises that
exact issue, and the Wisconsin Supreme Court will decide the fate of

Indian gaming once and for all. 291 With that case on the horizon, it is
clear that the Panzer decision is a prelude to the fate of Indian

gaming.
On January 13, 2005, the Wisconsin Supreme Court accepted a state

court of appeals invitation to hear Dairyland once again. 292 That case
is of fundamental importance to the Wisconsin tribes collectively because, unlike the plaintiffs in Panzer, the plaintiff in Dairyland,Dairy-

land Greyhound, seeks an injunction prohibiting the governor from
extending the existing compacts beyond their original five-year renewal term or entering into any new compacts in light of the 1993
Constitutional Amendment. 293 It is worthwhile to make clear that
Dairyland does not challenge the validity of the Original Compacts.

Rather, it contends that the "1993 [Constitutional] Amendment affected the Governor's power under state law prospectively so that in
1998 and thereafter he had no authority to amend, renew or in any
288. See Post-PanzerAmendments, supra note 285, 7(D) (stating that "[t]he Tribe may operate Class III gaming while this Compact, or an extension thereof under this sections [sic], is in
effect"); see also Steve Schultze & Patrick Marley, Casino Deal Restarts Payments 25-Year Pact
With Potawatomi to Bring $43.6 Million This Year, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Oct. 5, 2005, at Al
(explaining that "[t]hough the new pact doesn't say so explicitly, it also preserves the expanded
array of casino games that were authorized under the terms of the tribe's 2003 compact and
thrown out last year by the state Supreme Court").
289. See Post-Panzer Amendments, supra note 285, 9 (amending section XXXI.G.2 of the
Original Compact).
290. See supra notes 93-106 and accompanying text.
291. See supra notes 93-106 and accompanying text.
292. See High Court Agrees to Hear Gaming Suit Again, Wis. ST. J., Jan. 13, 2005, at B3
(explaining that the Wisconsin Supreme Court agreed to hear Dairyland again after previously
remanding the case to the Court of Appeals).
293. See Dairyland Greyhound Park v. McCallum, 655 N.W.2d 474, 476-77 (Wis. Ct. App.
2002).
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way extend the duration of the compacts for casino gambling. 2 94 Although the Panzer court expressly left that question open, the majority's decision and rationale will undoubtedly play an important role in
the Dairyland decision.

295

In Panzer, the majority found that Governor Doyle exceeded his
authority when he agreed to a compact provision that included additional Class III games. 296 In doing so, the majority noted that their
"holding . . . raises inevitable questions about the validity of the
[O]riginal Compact[s] and the 1998 amendments thereto. ' 297 This is

because, in the majority's words, "[c]learly, the 1992 Compact encompasses games that were and are precluded under our state's criminal

statutes.

'298

Further analysis of the majority decision reveals that it

contains mixed signals as to the continued validity of Indian gaming.
In concluding that Doyle unlawfully compacted with the Potawatomi to permit additional Class III gaming, the Panzer majority found

the 1993 Constitutional Amendment to be conclusive with respect to
the fact that such additional games were illegal. 299 According to the

majority, IGRA does not "grant Indian tribes in Wisconsin the right
to engage in gambling activities that are prohibited by the Wisconsin
constitution and Wisconsin criminal statutes to all persons, organizations, and entities in the state.

' 30 0

For the purposes of Dairyland,the

majority's analysis in Panzer means that after 1993, all forms of gambling not expressly permitted by Wisconsin law, as embodied in the

state constitution and criminal statutes, are illegal. 30 1 This leaves open
the question of whether the compacts as amended are still valid, and
30 2
the court expressly declined to tread into that territory.
294. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 11, Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc. v. Doyle, No.
03-0421, 2004 WL 2522611 (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 2004).
295. See Panzer v. Doyle, 680 N.W.2d 666, 697 (Wis. 2004).
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 693.
300. Id. at 695 n.36.
301. See Panzer, 680 N.W.2d at 696-98.
302. See id. at 697. The majority stated:
[W]e do not believe the 1992 compact suffered from any infirmity under state law when
it was entered into. Whether the 1992 compact is durable enough to withstand a
change in state law that alters our understanding of what is 'permitted' in Wisconsin is a
separate question. The resolution of this question is likely to turn, at least in part, on
the application of the impairment of contracts clauses in the United States and Wisconsin Constitutions as well as IGRA.
Id.
The court further noted that the plaintiffs in Panzer conceded the validity of the 1992 Original
Compacts and the 1998 amendments thereto, and the majority has "not as yet been presented
with a persuasive case to conclude otherwise." Id. at 697 n.38.
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Nevertheless, the Panzer court's conclusion that the 1993 Constitutional Amendment squarely precludes any form of gambling not expressly authorized, coupled with the fact that the Panzermajority held
that Doyle could not expand the scope of Class III gaming because
such games were illegal, suggests that the Dairyland court might
"complete the task begun by Panzer" by ruling that the Governor is

without authority to extend the compacts because such gaming is illegal under Wisconsin law. 30 3 In order to reach such a conclusion, the
court will inevitably have to also conclude that the 1993 Constitutional
Amendment did not violate the impairment of contracts clauses of the
30 4
United States Constitution and Wisconsin state constitution.
This is the exact result desired by Dairyland Greyhound. 305 Their
argument, although complex, can be reduced to the following points:

(1) All gambling not otherwise expressly permitted in Wisconsin is
illegal; (2) the governor is without authority to compact for games that
are illegal in the State; and (3) the 1993 Constitutional Amendment
does not violate the impairment of contracts clauses in the federal and
state constitutions. 30 6 As one can see, the Panzer decision works to
Dairyland Greyhound's advantage for the first two points. Specifically, Panzer upheld the notion that the 1993 Constitutional Amend-

ment (now embodied in article IV, section 24 of the Wisconsin
Constitution) prohibits all forms of gambling not expressly authorized
by Wisconsin law. 30 7 For purposes of emphasis, the 1993 Constitutional Amendment permits only bingo games conducted by charitable
organizations, raffles, a state lottery, and pari-mutuel on-track betting. 30 8 Furthermore, the Panzer majority's conclusion that "[n]othing

in section 24 [of the Wisconsin Constitution] authorizes electronic
keno, roulette, craps, and poker" supports the conclusion that the
Wisconsin constitution also prohibits blackjack and slot machines because those games are expressly prohibited. 30 9

303. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 294, at 12.
304. See Panzer, 680 N.W.2d at 697 ("Any attempt at this point to impair [the Original Compacts] would create serious constitutional questions.").
305. See generally Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 294, at 12-32.
306. Id.
307. See Panzer, 680 N.W.2d at 693 ("The text of the [state] constitution is absolutely clear:
'Except as provided in this section, the legislature may not authorize gambling in any form."').
308. WIs. CONST. art. IV, § 24(1)-(6).
309. Wis. CONST. art. IV, § 24(6)(c) states in relevant part:
(c) Notwithstanding the authorization of a state lottery under par. (a), the following
games, or games simulating any of the following games, may not be conducted by the
state as a lottery: 1) any game in which winners are selected based on the results of a
race or sporting event; 2) any banking card game, including blackjack, baccarat or
chemin de fer; 3) poker; 4) roulette; 5) craps or any other game that involves rolling
dice; 6) keno; 7) bingo 21, bingo jack, bingolet or bingo craps; 8) any game of chance
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The Panzer court also noted that this section of the Wisconsin constitution "acts as a limitation on both the legislature and the governor,
so that if one is prohibited by the provision, so is the other. '310 With
that premise, the Panzer majority concluded that because the state
lottery cannot conduct such games, the state's public policy is to prohibit them outright, and the "legislature may not authorize [new casino-type] gambling in any form." 311 As one case see, the Panzer
decision provides support for the proposition that the governor is
without authority to extend or renew the compacts because all Class
III gaming is expressly illegal in the State.
Accordingly, the Dairyland case will likely turn on issues of constitutional law-namely whether the 1993 Constitutional Amendment
violates the impairment of contracts clauses of the federal and state
constitutions. 312 If the court concludes that the 1993 Constitutional
Amendment does in fact violate the federal and state contracts clauses
with respect to the Original Compacts, then given Panzer's holding
that IGRA permits the State to negotiate only over games that are
expressly legal, Indian gaming in Wisconsin will be relegated to its
original 1992 form-permitting only those games that were allowed
pursuant to the Original Compacts. On the other hand, if the court
concludes that the 1993 Constitutional Amendment works no impairment on the compacts, then the Potawatomi, and the rest of the state's
tribes can cash in their chips because Indian gaming will be a phenomena of the past in Wisconsin.
C.

The Panzer Fallout Exemplifies How the Court Created Further
Confusion With Respect to the Compacting Process by Not
Providing Guidelines for Future Compacts

Despite the potential dire consequences that Panzer may have with
respect to Dairyland,it is unlikely that the Wisconsin Supreme Court
that is played on a slot machine or any mechanical, electromechanical or electronic device that is generally available to be played at a gambling casino ....
Id. (emphasis added).
310. Panzer, 680 N.W.2d at 693.
311. Id. at 696.
312. While the Panzermajority expressly declined to wade into these constitutional issues, the
dissent made the "impairment of contracts" analysis central to its opinion. See id. at 718-28
(Abrahamson, C.J., joined by Bradley, J., and Crooks, J., dissenting). In doing so, the dissent
concluded that the majority decision violated the impairment of contract clauses. Id. at 728.
Prophetically, the dissent noted that "[g]iven the majority's analysis ... what reasons could the
majority logically and legitimately use to retain the 1992 compact and 1998 amendments, yet
discard the 2003 amendments?" Id. at 727.
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will sound the death knell for Indian gaming in Wisconsin. 313 Accordingly, Panzer will continue to provide the framework for future compacting in the State of Wisconsin, and the Panzer fallout exemplifies
how the court's decision in that case did nothing more than create
further confusion with respect to the compacting process. Specifically,
the majority's decision provides no guidance for how long compacts
can endure-thus leaving the door open to future lawsuits regarding
duration provisions. 314 This problem is compounded by the fact that
315
the court's implicit procedural safeguards are not safeguards at all.
As the Panzer fallout shows, the majority's opinion fails to provide
guidelines for future compact negotiations, especially with respect to
the duration provision. This means that Governor Doyle and future
governors are relegated to compacting with the tribes in legal limbo.
As outlined above, the majority determined that the governor was
without authority to agree to a compact duration provision that circumvented the implicit procedural safeguards that sustained Section
14.035's constitutionality. 316 Again, those safeguards were that: (1)
the legislature retains the power to repeal Section 14.035 if it can override a gubernatorial veto; (2) the legislature may amend Section
14.035 (as they tried to and failed in this case); and (3) the "legislature
may appeal to public opinion" to influence the governor's actions. 317
By agreeing to a compact provision that endures indefinitely, the majority claimed that the governor "circumvent[ed] the procedural safeguards that insure that delegated power may be curtailed or reclaimed
by future legislative action. ' '31s
Yet, the majority failed to provide any guidance within its discussion as to how the governor can in the future agree to a duration provision that does not circumvent these implicit procedural
safeguards. 319 Instead, future governors are left to guess the length of

a duration provision that will not "terminate [the legislature's] ability
to make law in [the] important subject area [of Indian gaming]. '320
Taking the Post-Panzer Amendments as an example, a twenty-five313. Given the revenue stream that Indian gaming generates for the state and local government, abolishing Indian gaming all together would create enormous budget shortfalls. Furthermore, it could mobilize the tribes to exercise their political power against the justices, who are
elected officials. See Ed Garvey, Editorial, Tribe's Millions for Elections a Nail in Democracy's
Coffin, CAP. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2005 at 7A (discussing the political prowess of the tribes).
314. See infra note 319-323 and accompanying text.
315. See infra notes 324-327 and accompanying text.
316. Panzer, 680 N.W.2d at 692.
317. Id. at 689.
318. Id. at 690.
319. See generally id. at 689-92.
320. Id. at 692.
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year duration provision 32' would still severely curtail the legislature's

ability to make law in the area of Indian gaming, yet the court's decision does not provide any guidance as to whether such a provision
would also be unlawful.3 22 In fact, in Dairyland, the plaintiffs have

amended their petition to the Wisconsin Supreme Court to make that
exact argument. 323 Although Doyle seems to have slighted the court

by entering into the Post-PanzerAmendments (especially with respect
to the continuation of Class III gaming), those amendments nevertheless evince the fact that the court provided no guidance at all for fu-

ture compact negotiations with respect to acceptable duration
provisions.
This problem is compounded by the fact that the procedural safeguards that the majority cited to uphold the statute provide no gui-

dance for governors exercising their authority under Section 14.035.324
Again, take the twenty-five year duration provision contained within
the Post-PanzerAmendments as an example. 325 A compact that endured for twenty-five years would, for all intents and purposes, not be
affected if the legislature repealed or amended Section 14.035. Similarly, the public would not be able to influence the governor's actions

in relation to the compact provision in question.326 That is because, as
one commentator aptly pointed out, "[b]etween now and 2035, when
the [Post-Panzer Amendments would expire], Wisconsin will have
eight gubernatorial elections and sixteen legislative elections. '32 7 In
other words, the governor is left to compact blindly over gaming and
duration provisions because the court gave no guidance as to what

term of years would satisfy the implicit procedural safeguards.

321. See supra notes 285-286 and accompanying text.
322. See Panzer, 680 N.W.2d at 689-92 (holding that the duration provision was the result of
an invalid exercise of power but failing to discuss whether duration provisions of varying lengths
would similarly be invalid); see also Wawryzn, supra note 287, at 235-37 (explaining how the
twenty-five year duration provision of the Post-Panzer Amendments will also likely violate the
"implicit" safeguards relied upon by the Panzer majority).
323. See Patrick Marley, Dog Track Challenges New Casino Pact; Potawatomi Deal Still Unconstitutional, Dairyland Says, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Oct. 12, 2005, at B1 (reporting that
Dairyland Greyhound filed a motion with the Wisconsin Supreme Court in the pending Dairyland case to rule the Post-Panzer Amendments unconstitutional in light of Panzer).
324. See infra notes 325-327 and accompanying text.
325. See supra notes 285-286 and accompanying text.
326. While it is true that in one hundred years the legislature could act on Indian gaming, it is
not true that the public could influence the current governor's actions.
327. Wawrzyn, supra note 287, at 236.
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CONCLUSION

For the Potawatomi and the rest of Wisconsin's Native American
tribes, the majority decision in Panzer represents a sign that the new
buffalo may become an endangered species and might possibly face
extinction-at least in Wisconsin. Specifically, the majority decision
threatens the new buffalo in Wisconsin by holding that the governor
was without authority to agree to a compact provision that expanded
the permissible scope of Class III gaming. 328 In doing so, the majority
misinterpreted the statutory text of IGRA by reading the Cabazon
analysis out of the statute. 329 The potential ramifications are severe.
Beyond the fact that the tribes can ostensibly not conduct such expanded gaming operations, state revenues, which rely heavily upon
330
tribal payments pursuant to the compacts, will likely decrease.
The majority opinion further threatens the new buffalo in Wisconsin because it held that the governor was without authority to agree to
gaming compact provisions that caused the compacts to, for all intents
and purposes, endure indefinitely. 331 According to the majority, the
duration provision was invalid because it circumvents the implicit procedural safeguards that sustain the constitutionality of the law which
grants the governor the authority to enter into gaming compacts in the
first place. 332 In so holding, the majority failed to provide any guidelines as to what type of duration provision will not circumvent these
safeguards.

333

But a greater danger to the tribes looms in the distance-and it is
growing closer and closer as each day passes. 3 34 That danger is personified in Panzer's sister case, Dairyland.335 While the Panzer court

stopped short of addressing the fundamental issue of whether Indian
gaming is valid in Wisconsin pursuant to the 1993 Constitutional
Amendment, the Dairyland court will have to address that very question. 336 In deciding that case, Panzer will likely play a pivotal role
because the court's reasoning and rationale act to limit gaming in Wisconsin. 337 If the Dairyland court does "complete the task begun by
328. See generally supra notes 147-161 and accompanying text.
329. See generally supra notes 232-282 and accompanying text.
330. See generally supra notes 290-312 and accompanying text.
331. See generally supra notes 135-146 and accompanying text.
332. See generally supra notes 118-161 and accompanying text.
333. See generally supra notes 285-289 and accompanying text.
334. At the time this Note was submitted for publication, the court had yet to decide
Dairyland.
335. See generally supra notes 93-106 and accompanying text.
336. See generally supra notes 290-312 and accompanying text.
337. See generally supra notes 290-312 and accompanying text.

2006]

PANZER V. DOYLE

1383

Panzer," then the new buffalo will no longer roam the range in
33 8
Wisconsin.
Steven D. Hamilton*

338. See generally supra notes 313-327 and accompanying text.
* J.D. Candidate, DePaul University College of Law, 2006; B.A., University of WisconsinMadison, 2002. I would like to thank my family, especially my parents, for their continued support throughout law school. Furthermore, a special thank you to the editors at the DePaulLaw
Review for their assistance with this Note.
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